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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines whether Sino-Brazilian trade or investment significantly influences 
Brazil’s voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). To examine this 
relationship, this thesis regresses a dataset of UNGA votes, which the literature 
commonly uses to represent political influence, with trade and investment data. 
Understanding whether the growing Sino-Brazilian economic relationship politically 
impacts Brazil is important both to Brazil and to the United States. Any increase in 
Chinese influence on Brazil may translate into a corresponding decrease in U.S. 
influence, which may have implications for the health of Brazil’s democracy, regional 
stability and U.S. national security.  
This thesis crafts, for the first time in the literature on Sino-Brazilian relations, an 
estimable empirical model that examines whether trade or investment influences UNGA 
voting behavior between these two nations; this is an improved methodology for 
evaluating this relationship as previous studies relied on simple correlations. This thesis 
makes five hypotheses, and tests them with two types of voting affinity measurements 
using both regression analysis and simple correlations. This thesis finds that Brazil’s 
exports to China have a statistically significant, positive relationship, and U.S. aid has a 
statistically significant, negative relationship, to Sino-Brazilian voting affinity.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines whether Sino-Brazilian trade or investment significantly 
influences Brazil’s voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). To examine 
this relationship, the thesis will regress a dataset of UNGA voting patterns, which the 
literature commonly uses to represent political influence, with trade and investment data. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
China’s rise and subsequent expansion into new geographic areas, particularly 
that of Latin America, is of significant interest to the United States, both from an 
economic as well as from a security perspective. Of the Latin American nations, Brazil is 
the most important to China; Brazil is Latin America’s most populous nation, has a 
growing economy and offers a large consumer base for Chinese products. Sino-Brazilian 
trade has expanded dramatically over the years and, in 2009, China overtook the United 
States as Brazil’s number one trading partner. Given this expansion in trade, it is 
unsurprising that scholars and government analysts alike have begun to assess whether 
the Sino-Brazilian economic relationship has politically influenced Brazil. 
The literature commonly uses United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) votes 
as a proxy for political influence or political compliance.12 The UNGA arguably acts as a 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., “Trade Dependence and Foreign 
Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 191–
222. Others in the literature have examined the UNGA voting patterns of “aided nations” in an effort to 
measure “compliant behavior.” See, for example, Bruce E. Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent 
State,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 315–340; and Adrienne Armstrong, 
“The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 
(September 1981): 401–428.  
2 Although international trade is a “mode of exchanging commodities and currencies,” arguably 
“foreign policy behavior can also be considered an instrument of exchange;” in this case, foreign policy can 
be a “partial payment” for economic benefits; quoted in Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., 
“Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies 
Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 198. If trade is asymmetric, whereby one country is (relatively speaking) 
more economically dependent than another (relatively) more dominant country, then the dependent country 
“can satisfy the obligation of the asymmetrical exchange by supporting the foreign policy of the dominant 
country;” quoted in Richardson and Kegly (1980), 198–199). Political compliance, therefore, can result 
from an asymmetric economic relationship.  
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barometer for both the worldview and for the political tendencies of a nation. 
Understanding whether the growing Sino-Brazilian economic relationship politically 
impacts Brazil is important both to Brazil and to the United States. Analyzing the Sino-
Brazilian relationship is also critical for the United States; any increase in Chinese 
influence on Brazil may translate into a corresponding decrease in U.S. influence.3 A 
decrease in U.S. influence may have implications for the health of Brazil’s democracy, 
regional stability and U.S. national security. The research also will address to what 
degree, if any, U.S. military and economic assistance influences Brazil’s voting affinity 
with both the United States and China. Given the United States ties its aid decisions to 
certain UNGA votes, it will be interesting to see the effect U.S. aid has on voting. 
Additionally, the research may offer insight into what changes, if any, the United States 
might make in its relations with Brazil in order to increase U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity 
or, if desirable, decrease Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. 
C. PROBLEMS  
Anecdotally, one might conclude that increased levels of Sino-Brazilian trade or 
investment would positively influence Brazil’s voting patterns. Concerns over China’s 
growing influence have appeared in numerous newspaper articles.4 On the other hand, 
Brazilian politicians have stated their independence from China. These anecdotes suggest 
that determining the direction and significance of the relationship without empirical 
evidence is not fruitful. If Sino-Brazilian trade or investment influences Brazil’s voting 
patterns, then the United States may want to focus its attention on strengthening its own 
economic relationship with Brazil and should be concerned with the Sino-Brazilian 
economic relationship. On the other hand, if there is no significant relationship (or it is 
 
                                                 
3 This could, in fact, result in a change in influence for the European Union. This thesis, however, is 
concerned with the change in influence for the United States.  
4 See, for example, John Pomfret, “China Invests Heavily in Brazil, Elsewhere in Pursuit of Political 
Heft,” The Washington Post, July, 26, 2010; Sara Lana and Andrew Downie, “In Brazil, Hu Jintao Aims 
for Bigger Piece of Latin America Trade,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2010; Andrés Cala, 
“China Grabs Latin America, Well Ahead of Obama’s Outreach,” The Christian Science Monitor, March, 
21, 2011; James Morrison, “Chinese Power,” The Washington Times, May 11, 2005, World, Embassy 
Row, Page A15; Humphrey Hawksley, “Chinese Influence in Brazil Worries US,” BBC News, April 3, 
2006.  
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negative), then perhaps the United States should temper its concern over the Sino-
Brazilian economic relationship and should pursue other means to politically influence 
Brazil.  
The findings presented in this thesis offer an improved methodology for 
evaluating the relationship between voting affinity and trade; previous studies relied on 
simple correlations to discuss this relationship. This thesis crafts, for the first time in the 
literature on Sino-Brazilian relations, an estimable empirical model that examines 
whether trade or investment influences UNGA voting behavior between these two 
nations. The main variables appearing in the econometric model are as follows: UNGA 
votes, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), trade, and U.S. aid. Although the model is an 
improvement over past analyses, it is not without its own econometric issues. Given that 
the thesis employs time series data from different countries, it needs to address 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Thus, the thesis uses the Breusch-Pagan / Cook 
Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity and the Durbin-Watson Statistic to test for the 
presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Chapter IV, Results, reports the results of 
these tests and discusses what they mean in terms of the thesis. Ultimately, the thesis 
determines that heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are present.  
D. HYPOTHESES  
This thesis makes five hypotheses, and tests them with two types of voting 
affinity measurements for both regression analysis and simple correlations. All else being 
equal, this thesis hypothesizes the following: (1) a change in the level of exports from 
Brazil to China, as measured by the ratio of Brazilian exports to China to total Brazilian 
exports, may significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; (2) a 
change in the level of imports from China to Brazil, as measured by the ratio of Brazilian 
imports from China to total Brazilian imports, may significantly influence Brazil’s 
UNGA voting affinity with China; (3) a change in the level of Chinese FDI to Brazil, as 
measured by the ratio of Chinese FDI to total FDI in Brazil, may significantly influence 
Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; (4) a change in the level of U.S. aid to Brazil, 
as measured by U.S. economic and military aid to Brazil, may significantly influence 
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Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; and (5) a change in the level of U.S. aid to 
Brazil, as measured by U.S. economic and military aid to Brazil, may significantly 
influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with the United States. 
E. FINDINGS  
Based on the results of the regression analysis, this thesis rejects the null 
hypothesis (1), that a change in the level of exports from Brazil to China, as measured by 
the ratio of Brazilian exports to China to total Brazilian exports, may significantly 
influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China. It appears that Brazil’s exports to 
China have a statistically significant, positive relationship to Sino-Brazilian voting 
affinity. Due to a lack of statistically significant results, however, this thesis fails to reject 
hypothesis (2), that, all else being equal, a change in the level of imports from China to 
Brazil, as measured by the ratio of Brazilian imports from China to total Brazilian 
imports, may significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China. (3) 
Given a distinct lack of available data on Chinese FDI into Brazil, dropping FDI from the 
regression became necessary to reach a sufficient number of observations to run the 
econometric model. Given the lack of sufficient observations, this thesis used simple 
correlation to analyze the relationship between Chinese FDI into Brazil and Sino-
Brazilian voting affinity. The correlations suggest that there is a weak, negative 
relationship between Chinese FDI into Brazil  (as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward 
FDI) for the primary method of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. A weak, positive 
correlation, however, exists between the secondary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting 
affinity and Chinese FDI into Brazil (as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward FDI). This 
thesis was able to reject the null hypothesis (4), that a change in the level of U.S. aid to 
Brazil, as measured by U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil, may significantly 
influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; the results suggests that U.S. 
military and economic assistance to Brazil have a negative, statistically significant 
relationship to Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. The thesis fails to reject the null hypothesis 
(5), that a change in the level of U.S. aid to Brazil, as measured by U.S. economic and 
military assistance to Brazil, may significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity 
with the United States, due to a lack of statistically significant results. 
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F. CONCLUSIONS 
As far as this thesis is aware, the literature contains no other empirical evidence to 
indicate that Brazil is more likely to vote with China as a result of increased trade with 
China. An increase in Brazil’s exports to China, as a percentage of Brazil’s total exports, 
the more likely Brazil is to vote in accordance with China in the UNGA. This thesis also 
confirms what has appeared previously in the literature, that U.S. foreign aid (in this 
thesis, military and economic assistance) also appears to impact voting affinity. An 
increase in U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil indicates that Brazil is less 
likely to vote the same as China in the UNGA. These findings suggest that if the United 
States wants to decrease the voting affinity Brazil shares with China, it should increase its 
military and economic assistance to Brazil. While this may not be a policy goal for the 
United States, at the moment, being aware of this relationship may yet serve U.S. national 
security interests.  
Although not one of the five main hypotheses presented, this thesis also 
discovered that an increase in U.S. exports to Brazil (or an increase in Brazil’s imports 
from the United States), increases the likelihood that Brazil will vote in accordance with 
the United States in the UNGA. In contrast, an increase in U.S. imports from Brazil (or 
an increase in Brazil’s exports to the United States) decreases the likelihood that Brazil 
will vote with the United States in the UNGA. These findings suggest that if the United 
States wants to increase its voting affinity with Brazil, the United States should exports 
more to Brazil and import less from Brazil. Again, this increased U.S.-Brazilian voting 
affinity may not be a policy goal of the United States, but this understanding may help 
the United States achieve future regional policy goals. Brazil is an important regional 
player with a growing economy, thus it may behoove the United States to better 
understand what impacts its UNGA votes. 
 6
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While the logrolling literature strongly suggests that politicians trade votes on 
important issues,5 the literature lacks consensus as to whether a similar pattern of 
behavior exists between states. The UNGA offers a potential venue for exploring whether 
countries engage in strategic behavior with respect to economic and political decisions. 
The UN is unique among international organizations in that each member has one vote in 
the UNGA; thus, nations may merely express their preferences when voting on UNGA 
resolutions.6 On the other hand, UNGA votes may be a reflection of economic incentives 
among nation states, in essence, vote buying at the level of the state.7  
This literature review is presented in five remaining sections, which attempt to 
address the main research objectives of this thesis: the determinants of UNGA voting and 
whether the growing Sino-Brazilian economic relationship, as measured by Chinese trade 
and Chinese FDI, influences Brazil’s UNGA votes. If there is consensus in the literature 
as to whether trade or investment from a country significantly influences the voting 
                                                 
5 See the following works for an analysis of voting in the U.S. Congress: Lawrence S. Rothenberg and 
Mitchell S. Sanders, “Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in 
the U.S. Congress,” Public Choice 103, nos. 3–4 (2000): 259–270; Steven D. Levitt, “How Do Senators 
Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology,” American 
Economic Review 86, no. 3 (June 1996): 425–441; and James M. Snyder, Jr. and Tim Groseclose, 
“Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting,” American Journal of Political Science 44, 
no. 2 (April 2000): 193–211.  
6 See the following: Erik Gartzke, “Kant We All Just Get Along?” American Journal of Political 
Science 42, no. 1 (January 1998): 1–27; Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations. (New York, NY: Norton, 2001);  Randall W. Stone, 
“The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa.” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 
(November 2004): 577–591, as cited in David B. Carter and Randall W. Stone, “Sincere or Strategic? U.S. 
Aid Disbursements and Voting in the United Nations General Assembly” (paper prepared for presentation 
at the 4th annual conference of The Political Economy of International Organizations,  Zurich, Switzerland, 
January 28, 2011). 
7 See Eugene R. Wittkopf, “Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study,” The 
American Political Science Review 67, no. 3 (September 1973): 868–888. Also see the following: Kul B. 
Rai, “Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967–1976,” Journal of Peace Research 17, 
no. 3 (September 1980): 269–277; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Steven W. Hook, “U.S. Foreign Aid and UN 
Voting: Did Reagan’s Linkage to Strategy Buy Deference or Defiance?” International Studies Quarterly 
35, no. 3 (September 1991): 295–312;  T.Y. Wang, “U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of 
Important Issues,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (March 1999): 199–210, as cited in Carter, 
2011. 
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behavior of the recipient country, then this thesis need not empirically evaluate this 
claim. On the other hand, if disagreement exists in the literature regarding the 
determinants of UNGA voting, then it strengthens the motivation for this thesis; this 
thesis will not only empirically examine whether trade and FDI influences UNGA voting, 
but it will also present a detailed analysis of Chinese FDI in, and trade with, Brazil. 
B. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE UN AND VOTING IN THE UNGA 
In this section, this thesis examines the structure of the UN and, more importantly, 
how the UN establishes the agenda for UNGA votes. This thesis also discusses whether 
political influence prior to the final UNGA votes is important,and critiques the literature 
regarding UNGA votes and observable outcomes.   
1. A Brief History of the UNGA  
Few things are more politically salient to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
than the issue of the one-China policy; it guides the PRC’s global political (and even 
economic) relations and is a major source of friction in the region.8 While the PRC 
supports the one-China policy, both the PRC and Taiwan believe that they are the 
legitimate government. Given the foundational history of the UN, however, this 
contention is quite understandable.   
Following the conclusion of WWII, representatives of 50 countries met in San 
Francisco at the UN Conference on International Organization in 1945 to devise the UN 
Charter.9 Proposals previously drafted by representatives from China, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom and the United States during a meeting at Dumbarton Oaks, United 
                                                 
8 The one-China policy is especially salient for Sino-U.S. and Taiwan-U.S. relations. On 1 January 
1979, the United States officially recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China, 
simultaneously severing diplomatic ties to Taiwan. See Shu-Cheng Lin, “The United States Recognition of 
the People’s Republic of China: Implications for the International Status of the Republic of China” 
(master’s thesis, Texas Tech University, 1983). With the passage of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, 
however, the United States agreed to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character” and to “preserve 
and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations” (See Public Law 96-
98 96th Congress “Taiwan Relations Act, January 1, 1979,” American Institute in Taiwan, 
http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html) (accessed October 1, 2011). 
9 United Nations. “History of the United Nations,” http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory/ (accessed 
September 17, 2011). 
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States, in August-October 1944, guided the deliberations in San Francisco.10 The 
representatives signed the Charter on 26 June 1945. China, France, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and a majority of other signatories ratified the 
Charter on 24 October 1945, officially bringing the UN officially into existence.11  
While at the time of UN founding the Republic of China (ROC) occupied 
mainland China, the Communist takeover in October 1949 and the establishment of the 
PRC forced the ROC government to flee to Taiwan, where it instituted Taipei as the 
provisional capital in December 1949.12 The founding of the PRC called into question 
UN representation. The United States supported keeping the ROC as the UN 
representative for China and actively worked to “prevent proposals calling for admission 
of the PRC and the expulsion of the ROC from being put ion [sic] the General Assembly 
agenda.”13 With the expansion of the UN to the Third World, however, which tended to 
side with the PRC, the ROC lost its UN seat in 1971.14 During the 26th Session of the 
GA, in the 1976 plenary meeting on 25 October 1971, the UNGA passed Resolution No. 
2758 (XXVI):15 Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the 
United Nations, “Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and 
that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security 
                                                 
10 United Nations. “History of the United Nations,” http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory/ (accessed 
September 17, 2011). 
11 Ibid. 
12 BBC News. “Retreat to Taiwan,” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/asia_pacific/2000/taiwan_elections2000/1949_1955.stm 
(accessed September 17, 2011).  
13 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations? History, Issues, and 
Approaches” Issues & Studies, 30, no. 10 (October 1994): 108–131. See also, Vincent Wei-Chang Wang, 
“How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations? History, Issues and Approaches,” Department of Political 
Science, University of Miami Coral Gables, Florida,  
https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~vwang/Publications/Can_Taiwan_Enter_UN.pdf (accessed September 
17, 2011). 
14 Ibid. 
15 A total of 131 countries voted on the resolution, with Yes: 76, No: 35, Abstain: 17 and Non-voting: 
3. See: United Nations Bibliographic Information System. Online at http://unbisnet.un.org (accessed 
9/17/11). Both the United States and Brazil voted no on the Resolution.  
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Council.”16 The Resolution also decides to, “expel forthwith the representatives of 
Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and 
in all organizations related to it.”17 With the Resolution’s passage, the PRC became the 
official representative and Taiwan lost its UN voice; Taiwan, to this day, disputes the 
Resolution as being in violation of the UN Charter.18  
The 1945 UN Charter established the General Assembly (GA), one of five 
principal UN organs.19 The General Assembly (GA) “occupies a central position as the 
chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ” of the UN (General 
Assembly).20 The GA consists of all 193 members of the UN, which “provides a unique 
forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by 
the Charter. It also plays a significant role in the process of standard-setting and the 
codification of international law.”21 The GA meets in regular session “commencing on 
the Tuesday of the third week in September, counting from the first week that contains at 
least one working day”22 (the 66th session opened in September of 2011) and typically 
lasting through December; the GA also convenes special and emergency special sessions 
in accordance with the Rules of the Procedure of the GA.23 The UNGA oversees the UN 
 
                                                 
16 United Nations. “United Nations Resolution No. 2758. Resolutions Adopted by the General 
Assembly at its 26th Session,” United Nations Documentation: Research Guide, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r26.htm (accessed September 17, 2011). 
17) Ibid. 
18 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations? History, Issues, and 
Approaches” Issues & Studies, 30, no. 10 (October 1994): 108–131. See also, Vincent Wei-Chang Wang, 
“How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations? History, Issues and Approaches,” Department of Political 
Science, University of Miami Coral Gables, Florida,  
https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~vwang/Publications/Can_Taiwan_Enter_UN.pdf (accessed September 
17, 2011). 
19 The other four organs are, the Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, Secretariat, 
International Court of Justice. The original charter established six organs, but the Trusteeship Council 
suspended operations in 1994. 
20 United Nations. “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,” General Assembly of the United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (acccessed September 15, 2011).  
21 Ibid.  
22 United Nations. “Rules of Procedure of the United Nations,” http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/233/16/PDF/N0823316.pdf (accessed September 17, 2011). 
23 Ibid.  
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budget, appoints non-permanent members of the Security Council, receives and considers 
reports from other UN organs and makes recommendations in the form of GA 
Resolutions.  
A UNGA resolution is an opportunity for GA members to explicitly state their 
country’s position on a specific question. If a country’s foreign policy depends on a 
bilateral economic relationship, then a country can express this through a UNGA vote. As 
UNGA resolutions are not spontaneous affairs, the next subsection discusses how the 
UNGA sets its agenda. 
2. UNGA Voting: Agenda Setting and Voting Mechanisms 
The UNGA plans the agenda up to seven months before the start of a session, 
beginning with a preliminary list of items and followed by a provisional agenda, which 
the UNGA issues at least 60 days before the opening of the session.24 The Secretary-
General then submits a memorandum to the General Committee, which “provides 
background information on the organization of the session, consolidates the information 
relating to the provisional agenda and proposes the allocation of the agenda items to 
either the plenary or one of the Main Committees.”25 Following the session’s start, 
UNGA adopts a final agenda in a plenary meeting and allocates the work to Main 
Committees; the Main Committees then submit reports to the GA for consensus or for a 
vote.26 
Each Member of the GA has one vote and “votes taken on designated important 
issues, such as recommendations on peace and security and the election of Security 
Council members, require a two-thirds majority of Member States, but other questions 
are decided by simple majority.”27 Increasingly, UN Members have made efforts to reach 
consensus on issues, rather than coming to a decision by formal vote; this subsequently 
strengthens the support for the Assembly’s decisions. If the President, after consulting 
                                                 
24 United Nations. “General Assembly: Parliamentary Documents,” United Nations Documentation: 
Research Guide, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gasess.htm#gaagen (accessed September 17, 2011).  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
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with delegations, reaches an agreement, he can propose that the GA adopt a resolution 
without a vote.28 Thus, the GA adopts the majority of its resolutions without a vote. If the 
GA does vote, however, it documents it either as a recorded vote, or as a summary of the 
result.29 “Only a recorded vote, which must be requested before the voting is conducted, 
will clearly identify that stand that a Member State took on the issues under discussion. If 
such a request is not put forth, only the voting summary (i.e., the number of countries 
which voted for and against a resolution as well as those who abstained) will be made 
available without the identification of how a Member State voted.”30 The UN makes 
unofficial voting information accessible through a press release following the meeting’s 
conclusion.31 Official voting information is available through the record of the meeting at 
which the vote occurred.32 The Main Committees of the GA also conduct votes; the 
meeting records of the Committees as well as the reports that the Committees submit to 
the plenary on each agenda item contain a record of the Committee votes.33 Although UN 
Resolutions serve as “non-binding recommendations to States on international issues 
within its competence, it has, nonetheless, initiated actions—political, economic, 
humanitarian, social and legal—which have affected the lives of millions of people 
throughout the world.”34 
Before delving into the arguments common to the UNGA voting literature, this 
review would be remiss should it ignore an existing debate surrounding the efficacy of 
using UNGA voting patterns as an indicator of political influence or political compliance. 
While the literature exhibits few reservations about using UNGA voting patterns in such 
                                                 
28 United Nations. “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,” General Assembly of the United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (acccessed September 15, 2011). 
29 Ibid.  
30 United Nations. “General Assembly: Parliamentary Documents,” United Nations Documentation: 
Research Guide, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gasess.htm#gaagen (accessed September 16, 2011).  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 United Nations. “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,” General Assembly of the United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (acccessed September 15, 2011).  
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a manner, some scholars object to their use.35 Keohane, for example, maintains that 
focusing simply on the UNGA voting patterns themselves does not “provide us with 
comprehensive knowledge of General Assembly politics.”36 Further, a “sophisticated and 
accurate statistical analysis will indicate alignments and may provide clues to bargaining 
processes underlying them, but it does not yield detailed and relevant information about 
those processes.”37 Keohane’s point is plain; if individual members can affect the 
UNGA’s political process, which he defines as “the interactions between delegations and 
Secretariat members through which General Assembly decisions are reached,”38 then it is 
possible that they can impact “the choices with which the General Assembly is faced.”39 
In other words, internal UNGA politics can determine on what the UNGA ultimately 
votes; for this reason, focusing solely on the voting patterns themselves may ignore the 
bigger picture.40  
Although these objections may be justifiable, attempting to address this point, 
however, is problematic for several reasons. First, analyzing the internal politics at play 
within the UNGA may require, according to Keohane, relaxing the “standards of 
quantitative precision” that the voting data itself offers.41 If the data itself is imprecise, 
then its usefulness may be questionable. Second, the approach would be incredibly labor 
intensive and would necessitate “extensive interviewing of national representatives as 
well as careful analysis of the official record and the clues it provides, to discover who 
                                                 
35 See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly,” 
International Organization 21, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 221–237; Brian W. Tomlin, “Measurement and 
Validation: Lessons From the Use and Misuse of UN General Assembly Roll-call Votes,” International 
Organization 39, no. 1 (Winter 1985): 189–206. 
36 Robert O. Keohane, “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International 
Organization 21, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 221. 
37 Ibid., 221. 
38 Ibid., 222. 
39 Ibid., 223. 
40 See, for example, Barry B. Hughes, “Transaction, Data and Analysis: In Search of Concepts,” 
International Organization 26, no. 4 (Autumn 1972): 559–680. 
41 Robert O. Keohane, “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International 
Organization 21, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 226. 
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was active, in what ways, and with what effect.”42 To date, none in the literature have 
amassed this data.43 Third, it remains quite possible that the internal processes impacting 
on what the United Nations’ votes do not appear in any type of documentation; it is 
plausible that conversations amongst delegates, that in turn impact on what the UNGA 
votes, are not subject to official record. At the same time, relying on member interviews 
for such data assumes that members openly and honestly communicate their desires.  
Focusing on the internal politics of the UNGA also overlooks the inherent value 
of the UNGA votes themselves.44 Examining UNGA votes is useful for a variety of 
reasons. First, the UNGA has an almost universal membership with equal representation 
(one country, one vote). Second, UNGA voting dates back to 1946, which yields an 
abundance of data over a significant length of time; this no doubt increases the robustness 
of analysis using UNGA voting data. Third, this thesis does not seek to measure the 
internal politics (or inputs) behind UNGA voting; rather this study focuses on the 
outcome of the votes themselves. Furthermore, the error term of the model appearing in 
                                                 
42 Robert O. Keohane, “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International 
Organization 21, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 226 
43 No such dataset appeared in an extensive review of the literature. Compiling such a dataset is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
44 The United States itself has demonstrated its belief in the significance of the UNGA voting. In 
1983, the 98th Congress enacted Public Law (PL) 98–151 requiring the Permanent Representative of the 
United Nations to the United States to issue a report detailing the degree of support for the foreign policy of 
the United States as exhibited by a comparison of the voting practices on issues of major importance to the 
United States in the General Assembly and Security Council; PL 98–151 also prohibits the disbursement of 
appropriated funds to countries “engaged in a consistent pattern of opposition to the foreign policy of the 
United States” – see: Government Printing Office. “Public Law (PL) 98–151” Enacted During the First 
Session of the Ninety-Eighth Congress of the United States of America,  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-097/pdf/STATUTE-097-1-2.pdf (accessed June 13, 2011). 
Similarly, PL 98–164 requires the Secretary of State to submit a report “regarding the policies which each 
member country of the United Nations pursues in international organizations of which the United States is 
a member. The report shall describe generally each country’s foreign policies as reflected in its activities in 
international organizations [such as the UNGA] and shall detail their respective positions on major issues 
of interest to the United States, including key decisions relating to the budget of international 
organizations” – see: Government Printing Office. “PL 98–164” Public Laws Enacted During the First 
Session of the Ninety-Eighth Congress of the United States of America, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-097/pdf/STATUTE-097-1-2.pdf (accessed June, 13 2011). 
Furthermore, the first such report, pursuant to PLs 98–151 and 98–164, U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, indicated that UN votes matter for the following reasons: “1. UN 
votes determine the policy of the UN bodies; 2. UN votes focus world attention; 3. UN votes define world 
opinion on many issues; 4. UN votes affect U.S. foreign policy” – see: U.S. Department of State. “Voting 
Practices in the United Nations: A Yearly Analysis by the Department of State.” United Nations Collection 
of Princeton University Library. United Nations Depository Library No. 007, 
http://www.princeton.edu/%7Esbwhite/un/1983-I.pdf (accessed June, 13 2011). 
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Chapter III, Data and Methodology, will capture any internal UNGA politics that may 
sway the voting outcome. For these reasons, this thesis uses UNGA voting patterns as an 
acceptable measure of political influence. 
C. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE DETERMINANTS 
OF UNGA VOTING 
The purpose of this section is to review the literature on the determinants of 
UNGA voting to ascertain whether consensus exists as to what variables influence 
UNGA voting patterns. The literature, for example, has to some degree addressed the 
following: the impacts of an asymmetrical economic relationship, where a stronger 
nation’s economic interactions influence the compliance of a weaker state as exhibited by 
UNGA voting; 45 whether countries who are economically dependent on another nation 
form alliances that sway their UNGA vote, or if alliances already in existence generate an 
economic relationship;46 the impact of U.S. aid and various international organizations, 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, on UNGA voting;47 
and, the influence of ideology on UNGA voting pattern.48 This thesis surveys the existing 
evidence in the following subsections. 
                                                 
45 See, for example, Bruce E. Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State,” International 
Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 315–340; Adrienne Armstrong, “The Political Consequences 
of Economic Dependence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 (September 1981): 401–428; Neil R. 
Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., “Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A 
Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 191–222; Benjamin O. 
Fordham, “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (November 2010): 
685–696; Neil R. Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The American Political 
Science Review 70, no. 4 (December 1976): 1098–1109; Joe D. Hagan, “Domestic Political Regime 
Changes and Third World Voting Realignments in the United Nations, 1946–84,” International 
Organization 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 505–541. 
46 See, for example, Neil R. Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The 
American Political Science Review 70, no. 4 (December 1976): 1098–1109; William J. Dixon and Bruce E. 
Moon, “Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade Patterns,” Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 1 
(March 1993): 5–25. 
47 See, for example, Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm, “Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting 
in the UN General Assembly?” CESifo Working Paper no. 1724 (May 2006): 1–40; Axel Dreher, Peter 
Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, “Does U.S. Aid buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated 
Analysis,” Public Choice 136, nos. 1–2 (2008): 139–164. 
48 Niklas Potrafke, “Does Government Ideology Influence Political Alignment With the U.S.? An 
Empirical Analysis of Voting in the UN General Assembly,” The Review of International Organizations 4, 
no. 3 (September 2009): 245–268.  
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1. The Effects of Asymmetrical Economic Relationships 
As previously mentioned, several in the literature explore the impacts of an 
asymmetrical economic relationship on political compliance; many of these authors 
characterize the relationship in terms of dependency theory.49 Some in the literature50 for 
example, explore whether patterns exist in the case of asymmetrical influence employed 
by dominant countries such as the United States. The thought is that countries that are 
more economically dependent on the United States should exhibit “greater voting 
agreement,”51 in terms of their UNGA votes, with the United States than with other 
nations. The logic stems from the idea that a smaller country generally has a higher 
dependence on foreign trade for its exports and thus can become export dependent on the 
United States.52 “Because the larger economy dominates the smaller one through their 
mutual trade, the latter will be constrained to exhibit “cooperative” behavior born of 
economic dependence; it should behave deferentially.”53 Consequently, given the 
importance of the United States as a market for their goods, a nation with a small 
economy might be inclined to vote in way that is in line with the United States, and thus 
form an alliance in order to preserve that crucial trade relationship.  
                                                 
49 See, for example, Bruce E. Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State,” International 
Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 315–340; Adrienne Armstrong, “The Political Consequences 
of Economic Dependence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 (September 1981): 401–428; Neil R. 
Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., “Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A 
Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 191–222; Benjamin O. 
Fordham, “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (November 2010): 
685–696; Neil R. Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The American Political 
Science Review 70, no. 4 (December 1976): 1098–1109; Joe D. Hagan, “Domestic Political Regime 
Changes and Third World Voting Realignments in the United Nations, 1946–84,” International 
Organization 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 505–541. 
50 See, for example, Bruce E. Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State,” International 
Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 315–340; Adrienne Armstrong, “The Political Consequences 
of Economic Dependence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 (September 1981): 401–428; Neil R. 
Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., “Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A 
Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 191–222; Neil R. 
Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The American Political Science Review 
70, no. 4 (December 1976): 1098–1109. 
51 Neil R. Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The American Political 




While the literature has certainly observed the dependency phenomenon to a 
degree, it does not entirely explain divergence in voting patterns. Some in the literature,54 
for example, determined that countries dependent on the United States had a higher level 
of compliance in terms of UNGA vote on issues that they perceived had greater salience 
for the United States (e.g.,  the Soviet Union in the cold war era).55 In this manner, the 
literature has expanded dependency theory to examine alternative influences, at play in 
the complexity of UNGA voting. 
2. Implications of Ideology 
Perhaps building on Richardson’s earlier work, Niklas Potrafke explored whether 
government ideology, not unlike the U.S. stance during the Cold War period, influenced 
UNGA voting alignment.56 Potrafke discovered that, “leftwing governments were less 
sympathetic with U.S. positions” and that they opposed voting with the United States 
when the United States had a Republican president.57 This study has potential 
implications for the interactions of Brazil and China; it is conceivable that Sino-Brazilian 
political ideology in some way influences their voting behavior. What remains unclear is 
how a nation’s political ideology influences its economic relationship with others and 
whether staunch agreement (or dissention) on a subject will alter UNGA votes. A 
commonly purported Sino-Brazilian goal is to balance the influence of the United 
 
 
                                                 
54 Neil R. Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The American Political 
Science Review 70, no. 4 (December 1976): 1098–1109; Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., 
“Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies 
Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 191–222.  
55 The Untied States “ascribed great importance to its cold war relationship with the Soviet Union,” 
see Neil R. Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The American Political 
Science Review 70, no. 4 (December 1976): 1101.  
56 Niklas Potrafke, “Does Government Ideology Influence Political Alignment With the U.S.? An 
Empirical Analysis of Voting in the UN General Assembly,” The Review of International Organizations 4, 
no. 3 (September 2009): 245–268.  
57 Ibid., 263. 
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States;58 while Potrafke may raise awareness as to ideology’s impact on UNGA voting, it 
does precious little to discern whether this aspiration would, in turn, sway Brazilian 
voting patterns.  
3. Which Came First, the Alliance, or the Trade? 
While most scholars examining the relationship between alliances and 
international trade have found that alliances influence trade relations,59 others in the 
literature reverse the analysis of the causal flow. William Dixon and Bruce Moon, for 
example, discover that the political factors influence U.S. export patterns.60 At a basic 
level, a shared political philosophy and foreign policy, they argue, positively influences 
market penetration.61 Thus, political agreement fosters a stronger trade relationship. 
Benjamin Fordham, however, maintains that, “the benefit a state receives from commerce 
gives its leaders a motive to form alliances with their trading partners.”62 According to 
Fordham’s logic, once two nations have an economic relationship, they are thereby 
compelled to protect it by forming an alliance. While the two authors might appear to be 
in direct contrast to one another, their arguments are subtly different. Dixon and Moon 
focus more on specific political factors determine trade patterns, while Fordham centers 
on asymmetric alliances between a weak and a strong power and that alliance’s 
subsequent effect on international trade.63   
                                                 
58 See, for example, Jerry Harris, “Emerging Third World Powers: China, India and Brazil,” Race & 
Class 46, no. 3 (January 2005): 7–27 and Jorge Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: 
Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (2006): 1–59. 
59 Neil R. Richardson, “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” The American Political 
Science Review 70, no. 4 (December 1976): 1098–1109. 
60 William J. Dixon and Bruce E. Moon, “Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade Patterns,” 
Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 1 (March 1993): 5–25. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Benjamin O. Fordham, “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 
(November 2010): 685–696. 
63 While this thesis does not lag the data, future research may want to consider using this tool to 
address this issue statistically. 
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Another relevant branch of literature is whether outside aid influences UNGA 
voting patterns.64 Given the size of the organizations and the enormity of U.S. aid, it is 
unsurprising that the vast majority of the literature centers on the IMF, the World Bank, 
and U.S. aid. A recent study by Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele, 
found robust evidence to support the claim that the United States “buys” the UNGA votes 
of aid recipients.65 In presenting their own findings of the previous literature, the authors 
maintain that their disaggregated approach is an improvement on previous studies that 
“focus on the aggregate flows of aid.”66 They claim that, “aid with few restrictions 
imposed on recipients is more effective in buying political support,”67 for example, 
“general budget support and grants.”68 Similarly, in an earlier study, Axel Dreher and 
Jan-Egbert Strum found that countries that were recipients of funding from either the 
IMF or the World Bank were more likely to vote in the UNGA in line with the average 
G7 country.69  
Although the literature broadly discusses what may influence UNGA voting, the 
literature fails to specifically examine whether, and to what extent, trade or investment 
(either in terms of volume or composition) impacts a nation’s UNGA vote. Additionally, 
most of the literature is U.S. centric and therefore only considers how a nation votes in 
comparison to that of the United States. 
4. Stylized Facts 
The studies discussed in this section are important as these studies establish 
several stylized facts. First, U.S. aid significantly influences UNGA voting behavior. 
                                                 
64 See, for example, Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm, “Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting 
in the UN General Assembly?” CESifo Working Paper no. 1724 (May 2006): 1–40; Axel Dreher, Peter 
Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, “Does U.S. Aid buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated 
Analysis,” Public Choice 136, nos. 1–2 (2008): 139–164. 
65 Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, “Does U.S. Aid buy UN General Assembly 
Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis,” Public Choice 136, nos. 1–2 (2008): 139–164. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 141. 
68 Ibid., 157. 
69 Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm, “Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General 
Assembly?” CESifo Working Paper no. 1724 (May 2006): 1–40. 
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Second an asymmetric economic relationship, characterized by the economic dependency 
of a smaller nation on a larger nation, affects UNGA voting. Third, ideology, especially 
in the context of an asymmetric relationship, impacts UNGA voting. Fourth, alliances 
influence trade volume.  
D. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON SINO-BRAZILIAN 
RELATIONS 
This section of the thesis briefly reviews the evolution of Sino-Brazilian political 
and economic relations; it characterizes Sino-Brazilian relations and offers insight into 
the implications of this relationship for each nation. Following this, the thesis then 
examines the existing empirical evidence on whether Chinese trade with and investment 
in Brazil influences Brazil’s UNGA voting patterns.   
1. A Review of Sino-Brazilian Relations 
Brazil, as the largest Latin American country,70 is an attractive trading partner for 
China. Increased Sino-Brazilian trade has not only provided China with export markets 
and access to an abundant supply of natural resources, but it has also offered 
opportunities for expanded political ties between the two nations. Brazil has a growing 
economy and offers a large consumer base for Chinese products, making it the most 
important Latin American nation to China. Additionally, it has an ample supply of natural 
resources that are important to China’s manufacturing sector, which is tied directly to 
China’s economic security. China arguably also has emerged as one of the most 
important countries to Brazil. China provides Brazil with an ancillary market for its 
exports, allowing Brazil to diversify its trade. A diverse market, in Brazil’s eyes, 
safeguards their economy against potential shocks associated with an overreliance on one 
                                                 
70 Brazil is South America’s largest country in terms of population, land mass and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
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market.71 Brazil also sees China as a key investor, at a time when the United States is 
distracted with multiple wars and economic crises.72 
Brazil’s importance to China, and vice versa, while predominantly economic in 
nature, also appears to extend into the political realm. Sino-Brazilian political relations 
have been mutually beneficial, though arguably more so to China than to Brazil. 
Although the two nations are geographically and culturally distant, they remain 
developing countries with a “South-South” connection. Brazil and China wish to be 
recognized as legitimate, strong players in the global system, both politically and 
economically.73 Moreover, both China and Brazil may aspire to balance the power of the 
United States, believing that a more proportionate power structure benefits their 
individual interests.  
2. Characterizing Sino-Brazilian Economic Relations 
Despite considerable geographic and cultural separation, the relationship between 
China and Brazil is far from recent history; in fact, relations between the two nations date 
back as far as the 1800s.74 In 1974, Brazil was among the first of the Latin American 
countries to officially diplomatically recognize the PRC. This formal diplomatic 
                                                 
71 Brazil endeavors to balance its trade by splitting it in roughly comparable proportions. See:  Jorge 
Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” Inter-American 
Dialogue Working Paper (2006): 1–59. In fact, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said the 
following of Brazilian trade relations:  “A few years ago, if the United States coughed, Brazil got 
pneumonia. Now we have diversified; we don’t depend so much on one or two countries.” See: Cristina 
Militi, “Brazil and the United States: Two Regional Superpowers Begin to Re-evaluate their Relations,” 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, (2008) http://www.coha.org/brazil-and-the-united-states-two-regional-
superpowers-begin-to-re-evaluate-their-relations/ (accessed December 10, 2009). 
72 Tyler Bridges, “China Makes its Move As U.S. Falls Back in Latin America,” McClatchy 
Newspapers (2009) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/08/71510/china-makes-its-move-as-us-falls.html 
(accessed April 2, 2010). 
73 Jerry Harris, “Emerging Third World Powers: China, India and Brazil. Race & Class 46, no. 3 
(August 2004): 7–27. 
74 Chinese tea first came to Brazil in 1810 and was mostly cultivated in the Botanical Garden. In order 
to assure the tea plantation’s success, which was hoped to supply the European market, the Count of 
Linhares, Portugal’s Prime Minister at the time, procured the immigration of several hundred Chinese 
colonists. See: James C. Fletcher, and Daniel P. Kidder. Brazil and the Brazilians Portrayed in Historical 
and Descriptive Sketches [1829]. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
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recognition furthered trade relations75 between the two nations, a relationship that both 
characterizes and underpins the bulk of Sino-Brazilian interactions to this day. In 1993, 
Brazil became the first Latin American country to receive recognition from China as a 
strategic partner76 Brazil reciprocated the recognition in referring to China as a strategic 
partner.77 As China’s global economic reach expanded, it undertook negotiations to enter 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Following fifteen years of strained talks, China 
officially entered the WTO in 2001.78  
Despite the grueling negotiating process, China’s entry, however, was not without 
its concessions. As part of its accession, China allowed nations to refrain from 
recognizing it as a market economy until 2016.79 Brazil was again a frontrunner with 
respect to economic relations when, in 2004, it was among the first nations80 to recognize 
                                                 
75 In 1974, Brazil’s imports from China, as a percentage of Brazil’s total imports were at an almost 
inexistent level of 0.004%. In 1993, this increased to 0.681%, rising to 1.41% in 1994, immediately 
following regnition. In 2008, imports were at 12.09%. In 1974, Brazil’s exports to China, as a percentage of 
Brazil’s total exports were at 0.238%. In 1993, this rose to 2.02% and dropped to 1.89% in 1994. In 2008, 
exports were at 8.29%. 
76 See, for example: R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009) and Wenran Jiang. “China and India Come to Latin America For 
Energy. Chapter 17 in Energy cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Benefits and impediments, by 
Sidney Weintraub (ed.) Significant Issues Series 29, no 2. (Washingtong, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2007). 
77 A “strategic partnership” (arguably a soft power mechanism) involves the promotion of: economic 
relations, cultural awareness, shared political goals, global and regional security and mutual trust. China 
uses bilateral initiative on an informal level in order to limit its potential risks from more formal 
mechanisms. See: Kerry Dumbaugh. China’s Foreign Policy: What Does It Mean For U.S. Global 
Interests? Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, RL34588, 2008.  
78 Jane Kirby. “China Enters WTO Fold,” BBC News, Monday, September 17, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1548866.stm (accessed April 3, 2010).  
79 China could, however, gain recognition as a market economy before the end of the period if it 
fulfilled the respective WTO member state’s requirements for such recognition. See: World Trade 
Organization. “Accession of the People’s Republic of China – Decision of 10 November.” WT//L/432 (01–
5996). Section 15(d). Price comparability in determining subsidies and dumping, (November 23, 2001). 
80 In 2004, New Zealand and Chile were the first, in the world and in the Latin American region, 
respectively, to recognize China as a market economy.  
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China as a market economy.81 Brazil’s market economy recognition, in theory, would 
greatly benefit China, mainly because other nations’ anti-dumping claims could be 
potentially more difficult to realize.82 Brazil’s statement of China’s market economy 
status not only directly benefitted China due to purported increased protection against 
anti-dumping claims, but it also saw expanded Sino-Brazilian trade, arguably aiding both 
Brazil and China.83 
a. An Expanding Relationship  
China and Brazil’s economic relationship includes the sharing of 
technology in many different realms, encompassing everything from the oil and 
manufacturing sectors to that of the aircraft and nuclear industries to space technology. 
Among these are projects with Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras), Brazil’s state-owned oil 
company; Embraco, a Brazilian compressor manufacturer; Embraer, a Brazilian aircraft 
manufacturer; and the Brazilian National Space Research Institute (INPE), which directly 
 
 
                                                 
81 In a 2004 Memorandum of Understanding, Brazil recognized China as a market economy. Brazil, 
however, never declared China to be a market economy in its domestic law; some attribute this lack of 
institutionalization to stem from the Brazilian Government’s disappointment in the level of Chinese 
investments in Brazil and China’s unfulfilled promise of support for a permanent U.N. Security Council 
seat. In effect, Brazil behaves as if China does not have market economy status. See: International Bar 
Association. “Anti-dumping Investigations Against China in Latin America. The Non-market Economy 
Issue in Anti-dumping Investigations Against China in Latin America. (London, UK: International Bar 
Association Divisions Project Team, 2010).  
82 China is arguably less able to defend its firms from anti-dumping claims made by countries that do 
not recognize it, or treat it, as a market economy. Initially, it was thought that Brazil would be less 
successful in pursuing anti-dumping claims against China; however, this has not rung true. Brazil’s anti-
dumping claims against China jumped dramatically from zero in 2005 to eleven in 2006, with nine claims 
resulting in final measures the following year. In 2009, however, Brazil put forth only one new 
investigation against China, and three cases where they took final measures, see International Bar 
Association. “Anti-dumping Investigations Against China in Latin America. The Non-market Economy 
Issue in Anti-dumping Investigations Against China in Latin America. (London, UK: International Bar 
Association Divisions Project Team, 2010). . It would appear initially that China stood to gain more from 
this recognition than did Brazil. While Brazil may have anticipated greater difficulty in putting forth anti-
dumping measures on China, they hoped that their recognition of China as a market economy would solicit 
China’s support in their bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. I discuss Brazil’s 
hopes for a U.N. Security Council seat in greater depth in the pages that follow. 
83 Brazil’s imports from China, as a percentage of Brazil’s total imports, were at 4.64% in 2003, 
6.14% in 2004, and 12.09% in 2008. Brazil’s exports to China, as a percentage of Brazil’s total exports, 
were at 6.19% in 2003, 5.63% in 2004, and 8.29% in 2008. 
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contribute to Chinese FDI in Brazil. Additionally, collaboration in the nuclear and 
defense industries are expanding and one might expect this to become a growing source 
of FDI.  
To support their economic relations, China and Brazil are progressively 
formalizing their partnership and creating both governmental and business infrastructure, 
which not only facilitate Chinese FDI in Brazil, but also Brazilian FDI into China. 
According to Ellis, “Brazil has a series of permanent coordinating mechanisms and a 
relatively well-developed government bureaucracy” to further its economic relationship 
with China.84 The two nations have conducted high-level meetings to manage their 
strategic relationship. In 2006, for example, the High Level Coordination and 
Cooperation Committee (COSBAN) Commission, the main senior-level government 
coordinating body, met in Beijing to discuss the future of their strategic partnership.85 
Following this, in 2007, the two nations held the first “strategic dialogue” in São Paulo, 
which included “representatives from both countries’ governments and private sectors.”86  
Beyond official coordination methods, the Brazilian government also has 
the capacity to promote Brazilian companies that endeavor to engage in trade with 
China.87 In 1736 Brazil established the Ministério das Relações Exteriores or Ministry of 
External Relations, which has offices in both Beijing and Shanghai.88 Under the 
Ministry’s umbrella lies the Trade Promotion Department, which implements the “system 
of trade promotion.”89 According to the Ministry’s website, their system of trade 
promotion is, “aimed at increasing Brazilian exports, publicizing investment 
                                                 
84 R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
85 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “Joint Communiqué Between the People's 
Republic of China and The Federative Republic of Brazil on Further Strengthening China-Brazil Strategic 
Partnership,” May 19, 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t566945.htm (accessed April 7, 
2010).  
86 R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
87 Ibid. 
88 See Ministry of External Relations’ website at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/. 
89 According to the Ministry’s website, the Foreign Office Trade Promotion Department has three 
divisions, each with specific functions, and 52 Trade Promotions Sectors (known as “Secom's”), located in 
embassies and consulates abroad.  
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opportunities and stimulating the transfer of technology and the flow of tourists into 
Brazil.”90 Rodrigo Tavares Maciel, executive secretary of the Brazil-China Business 
Council, noted in a December 2007 phone interview with Sino-Latin American expert, R. 
Evan Ellis, that a gap exists between the availability of Brazilian government personnel 
and resources, in nearly all Brazilian trade promotion offices and embassies, and the 
demand of both Brazilian companies wanting to trade with China and Chinese companies 
looking to promote their business in Brazil exceeds available resources.91  
Along with the Ministry of External Relations, Brazil has the Brazilian 
Agency for Investment and Export Promotion (APEX), which is an official organization 
geared towards promoting Brazil’s exports. In 2007, Dr. Alessandro Teixeira became the 
president of APEX and it was under his new leadership that, in 2009, APEX opened a 
Beijing office, APEX’s first in China.92 APEX also signed an agreement with the China 
Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and APEX to promote bilateral 
trade.93 APEX attended the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, which took place in Shanghai 
from 1 May to 31 October 2010 as part of the Brazilian pavilion.94  
Brazil’s capacity to promote trade with China, however, extends beyond 
the Brazilian government level; it also has a mature commercial infrastructure. Brazil 
boasts large, capable companies with many resources – such as Petrobras and Embaer, an 
aircraft manufacturer. Brazil also has a capable banking sector that has a growing interest 
in China.95 Increasingly, Brazil has been involved in trade fairs, hosting its third Forum 
                                                 
90 See: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/. 
91 R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
92 ApexBrasil. “Brazil, A Clear Cut Choice of Investment During Economic Slump,” August 26, 2009, 
http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/portal_apex/publicacao/engine.wsp?tmp.area=149&tmp.texto=5991 
(accessed April, 10 2010). 
93 R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
94 See: http://en.expo2010.cn/hqindex.htm. 
95 Relations between the two nations have expanding; Brazilian banks now have commercial offices 
located in China and Chinese banks have offices in Brazil. See: R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The 
Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
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for East Asia-Latin America-Cooperation (FEALAC) in 2007.96 In 2007, the number of 
chambers of commerce focused on China numbered 37.97 Given mutual and increasing 
interest for conducting business between the two nations, and continued support from the 
private and public sectors alike, Sino-Brazilian economic relations will likely flourish 
into the future.  
To further promote trade relations, both China and Brazil have witnessed 
increased intellectual advancements to facilitate shared mutual understanding. In the 
early 1960s, China opened the Institute of Latin American Studies, the “first Chinese 
organization devoted wholly to the study of Latin American affairs.”98 Research efforts 
ceased during the Cultural Revolution, continuing 1976.99 In 1981, the responsibility for 
the Institute shifted from the research arm of the Chinese Communist Party’s Liaison 
Department to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).100 The Chinese 
Communist Party (CPC) established the Department for Studies about Latin America.101 
Perhaps more importantly, however is the CPC’s endeavor to establish party-to-party 
relations to enhance state-to-state relations; today the CPC has ties with more than 20 
political parties.102 These institutions foster research on a variety of Latin American 
countries and reward country specialists for their knowledge.103 
While Brazil’s top, and arguably most influential, think tank, Fundação 
Getulio Vargas,104 has researched issues related to China, they appear to lack a partner 
                                                 
96 The fourth forum took place in Tokyo, Japan in January 2010.  
97 R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
98 Mark Sidel, “Latin American Studies in the People’s Republic of China. Latin American Research 
Review 18, no. 1 (1983): 143–153. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Jorge Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” 
Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (2006): 1–59.  
102 Shixue Jiang, “The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective. Chapter two in Riordan Roett and 
Guadalupe Paz, (eds). China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications For Latin America 
and the United States. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008). 
103 Jorge Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” 
Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (2006): 1–59.  
104 See the Fundação Getulio Vargas website: http://www.fgv.br/. 
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institute in China; this may hinder Brazil’s understanding of China. The rapid expansion 
of Chinese language schools in Brazil and the mutual increased interest has also aided 
economic relations.105 Despite efforts from both nations, polling data reveals that neither 
region knows much about the culture and business methodology of the other.106 China 
and Brazil will likely bridge this educational and cultural gap over time, further 
escalating their economic interconnectedness. These linkages between the two nations 
will seep into the political realm and impact not only Sino-Brazilian relations, but also 
the interactions each nation has with the United States, and, on a larger scale, relations 
within the hemisphere.  
3. Characterizing Sino-Brazilian Political Relations 
While economic matters arguably characterize the preponderance of Sino-
Brazilian relations, a discussion on their interactions would be remiss if it disregarded the 
important political component. Due to the interconnected nature of economics and 
politics, it is, at times, difficult to decipher the root motivation to Sino-Brazilian 
associations. And, what might be purely economic for one nation could be politically 
motivated for the other. That said, Brazil and China do share political aspirations. They 
both wish to be seen as important players in the global scene.107 China often refers to a 
shared “South-South” connection to Brazil and supports, as does Brazil, the containment 
of the United States.108 Both Brazil and China, along with Russia and India, are a part of 
                                                 
105 See: Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, “Brazil: Dances with Dragon. China’s Soft Power Drive 
Combined With Economic Interest Opens New Doors in Brazil,” Yale Global, December 1, 2009, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/brazil-dances-dragon (accessed April 16, 2010). There are over 40 
Chinese language schools in São Paulo alone. 
106 David Shambaugh, “China’s New Foray Into Latin America,” (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 2010). 
107 Jerry Harris, “Emerging Third World Powers: China, India and Brazil,” Race & Class 46, no. 3 
(January 2005): 7–27. 
108 See: Jerry Harris, “Emerging Third World Powers: China, India and Brazil,” Race & Class 46, no. 
3 (January 2005): 7–27 and Jorge Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, 
Asymmetric Hopes,” Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (2006): 1–59.  
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the BRIC countries,109 which have rising economies. BRIC countries may also have the 
incentive and ability to cooperate politically, which could them more collective global 
power; this, as of yet, appears largely unrealized.110 
The two nations often exploit their economic relationship for individual or shared 
political gains. As previously mentioned, for example, China used its position as a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to influence Brazil’s 2004 decision to 
recognize China as a market economy. While China had the economic goal of achieving 
this status, in part to deflect Brazil’s anti-dumping claims against China in the WTO, 
Brazil’s motivations were predominantly political. Brazil believed that if it recognized 
China as a market economy, many years before the deadline of 2016, then China would 
support the growth of the U.N. Security Council to give Brazil a permanent seat with veto 
power.111 It appears however that China may have misled Brazil as they later announced 
that they did not support the U.N. Security Council’s expansion.112 Thus what may have 
appeared to be an economically motivated move had both economic and political 
ramifications. 
Just as Brazil’s recognition of China’s market economy blurred the line between 
the political and economic, arguably so too does China’s official involvement in Latin 
American regional affairs. Although China has been engaged in Latin American 
                                                 
109 Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs coined the term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and stated that, 
“over the next 10 years, the weight of the BRICs and especially China in world GDP will grow, raising 
important issues about the global economic impact of fiscal and monetary policy in the BRICs” (O’ Neil, 
2001).  
110 Joseph Nye, “What’s in a BRIC? Not As Much As Many Observers Imagine,” The Daily Star, 
May 14, 2010, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=114822#axzz0p2qWf4O4 
accessed May 20, 2010). 
111 See, for example, R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009); David J. Lynch, “China’s Growing Pull Puts Brazil in a Bind. USA 
Today, March 21, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2006-03-21-brazil-china-cov-usat_x.htm 
(accessed April 10, 2010); and Renato Baumann, “Some Recent Features of Brazil-China Economic 
Relations,” United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, April 2009, 
http://www.cebc.org.br/sites/500/521/00001316.pdf (accessed May 15, 2010). 
112 China opposes long-time rival Japan from having veto power in the UN Security Council; the 
United States opposes the same for Germany. See: ABC News. “China, US to Jointly Oppose UN Council 
Expansion,”August 2, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200508/s1430656.htm (accessed April 
13, 2010). 
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economic and political affairs for quite some times, both the importance and weight of 
China’s exploits have heightened in recent years. In 1993, China’s relationship with the 
Latin American Parliament began, paving the way for further regional integration. For 
example, in 1998, China joined the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB); they received 
official observer status to the Organization of American States (OAS) in 2004 and 
became a non-borrowing member113of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 
2009. Although it may be difficult to clearly deduce whether Chinese participation in 
these organizations is for economic or political (or both) motivations, it lends a certain 
amount of legitimacy to China as a regional player. 
4. Empirical Evidence on Whether Sino-Brazilian Trade or Investment 
Influences Brazil’s UNGA Voting Pattern 
Dominguez114 represents the main work addressing whether Sino-Brazilian trade 
or investment altered Brazil’s UNGA voting pattern. While the Dominguez paper is 
highly relevant, the topic of China’s influence on Brazil’s UNGA vote appears in a 
relatively small section of a much larger Inter-American Dialogue115 paper. Dominguez 
argues that there is no statistically observable effect of the trade boom on Brazilian 
UNGA voting. First, and foremost, the Dominguez piece presents only correlations and 
does not address the issue of causality. This thesis uses a more robust analysis, which 
relies on multivariate regressions; thus, it can make causal inferences based upon the 
results. Second, Dominguez used his own UNGA voting data,116 and did not make them 
publicly available. For this reason, replicating his results is not possible at this time. 
Given these shortcomings, it would be fallacious to accept the conclusions that 
Dominguez derived without increasing the potency of analysis. 
                                                 
113 Non-borrowing members provide capital and have voting representation in the Bank’s Board of 
Governors and Board of Executive Directors according to their capital subscriptions. 
114 Jorge Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” 
Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (2006): 1–59. 
115 For more information on the Inter-American Dialogue, please see: 
http://www.thedialogue.org/About_the_Dialogue. 
116 Dominguez failed to state in the paper that the dataset was his own. 
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5. Concluding Thoughts 
What appears above is by no means an exhaustive examination of the literature on 
the determinants of UNGA voting patterns. If anything, the literature reviewed here 
serves to illuminate the complexity of UNGA voting, especially considering what factors 
the literature has identified (to varying degrees) as potentially relevant voting affinity. 
While relevant to some extent, many of the works on this topic are outdated; the world is 
a very different place from the 1970s and 1980s from which some of these studies came. 
Additionally, the literature on the impact of trade or investment on UNGA voting is, at 
best, incomplete and almost centrally focused on whether nations vote in alignment with 
the United States. This yields little insight into the dynamic of China and Brazil, two 
rapidly developing countries with varying strengths and weaknesses. 
More specifically, there is a paucity of empirical evidence whether Sino-Brazilian 
trade or investment significantly influences Brazil’s votes in the UNGA. To date, the 
literature discussing the impact of Sino-Brazilian trade or investment has largely focused 
on anecdotal evidence and case materials. While these studies have made valuable 
contributions to the literature, this thesis aims to provide a robust empirical analysis of 
this question.  
The review of the literature for this thesis noted that there is a lack of consensus 
as to whether trade or investment influences UNGA voting behavior. As such, this thesis 
does not assume a priori whether trade or investment affects UNGA voting. The 
literature, however, notes that trade appears to influence UNGA voting. This thesis will 
thus need to control for foreign trade to determine whether FDI influences UNGA voting.  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter II of this thesis reviewed the literature and developed a set of stylized 
facts regarding the influence of a bilateral economic relationship on UNGA voting. There 
is a distinct lack of empirical evidence regarding whether the growing economic 
relationship between China and Brazil influences Brazil’s foreign policy, as proxied by 
its UNGA voting behavior. This chapter develops a framework for empirically 
investigating the influence of international trade, international economic and military 
assistance, and FDI on UNGA voting with specific focus on the relationship between the 
PRC and Brazil. 
The chapter will use a single case study and statistical analysis. It will employ 
Sino-Brazilian economic data on trade and investment. The data are readily available 
through the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS),117 World Development 
Indicators (WDI)118 and the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)119 databases. The 
research will also utilize Christopher Kilby’s update120 to Erik Voeten and Adis 
Merdzanovic’s data121 on UNGA voting as a proxy for political influence.  
The objective of this chapter is to present an empirical methodology for 
estimating the influence that the variables of interest have on Brazil’s UNGA voting 
pattern over time. The second section of this chapter specifies the testable hypotheses. 
The third section discusses the measurement of UNGA votes and the data sources that 
Chapter IV uses for the estimation. Additionally, this chapter defines and discusses the 
variables that Chapter II developed to test the stylized facts. The fourth section of this 
                                                 
117 See: http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=169393. 
118 See: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
119 See: http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170921. 
120 Christopher Kilby, “The Political Economy of Conditionality: An Empirical Analysis of World 
Bank Loan Disbursements,” Journal of Development Economics 89, no. 1 (April 2008): 61–61. 




chapter develops the empirical framework and specifies the estimation equations that 
Chapter V uses to test the hypotheses of interest. The fifth section of this chapter provides 
some descriptive statistics of particular interest to this thesis.  
B. EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESIS 
The purpose of this section is to review the stylized facts presented in Chapter II 
of this thesis and to specify the empirical hypotheses of interest. This thesis is specifically 
interested in whether Brazil’s voting affinity, as measured by the ratio of Brazil’s actions 
in the UNGA that coincide with similar Chinese actions, changes in response to shifts in 
international trade, international investment, and U.S. international aid. 
1. International Trade 
A priori, there appears to be a consensus in the literature that international trade 
positively and significantly influences a country’s foreign policy with respect to its major 
trading partners. If so, then this thesis would expect, a priori, that an increase in bilateral 
trade flows between China and Brazil, relative to the overall level of Brazilian 
international trade, would increase the likelihood that Brazil’s UNGA votes are the same 
as China’s UNGA votes.  Rather than using aggregate exports and imports as one 
measure, this thesis examines whether an increase in the share of exports (imports) 
relative to total exports (imports) to (from) China influences Brazil’s voting behavior. 
a. Hypothesis One 
All else being equal, a change in the level of exports from Brazil to China, 
as measured by the ratio of Brazilian exports to China to total Brazilian exports, may 
significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China.   
b. Hypothesis Two 
All else being equal, a change in the level of imports from China to Brazil, 
as measured by the ratio of Brazilian imports from China to total Brazilian imports, may 
significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China.  
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2. Foreign Direct Investment 
A priori, there appears to be a consensus in the literature that FDI positively and 
significantly influences a country’s foreign policy with respect to its major investment 
partners. If so, then this thesis would expect that Brazil’s UNGA votes would conform to 
those of China over time. Controlling for the other determinants of UNGA voting, this 
thesis should observe that a permanent change in the level of FDI between Brazil and 
China impacts Brazil’s voting behavior. 
a. Hypothesis Three 
All else being equal, a change in the level of Chinese FDI in Brazil, as 
measured by the ratio of Chinese FDI to total FDI in Brazil, may significantly influence 
Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China.  
b. U.S. Aid 
A priori, there appears to be a consensus in the literature that U.S. aid 
positively and significantly influences a country’s foreign policy with respect to its 
UNGA voting. If so, then this thesis would expect that Brazil’s UNGA votes would more 
closely conform to those of United States over time. Controlling for the other 
determinants of UNGA voting, this thesis should observe that a permanent change in the 
level of U.S. aid between Brazil and the United States influences Brazil’s voting 
behavior. 
c. Hypothesis Four 
All else being equal, a change in the level of U.S. aid to Brazil, as 
measured by U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil, may significantly influence 
Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China. 
d. Hypothesis Five  
All else being equal, a change in the level of U.S. aid to Brazil, as 
measured by U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil, may significantly influence 
Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with the United States. 
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C. DATA SOURCES 
This section of the thesis discusses from where the data for the econometric model came. 
It describes the data and offers insights into any known problems with the data 
methodology or type. 
1. UNGA Voting Data 
As previously mentioned, this thesis uses Kilby’s update to Voeten and 
Merdzanovic data on UNGA voting.122 Kilby’s dataset corrects a few coding errors 
(country codes) in Voeten’s dataset. Both the Kilby and Voeten datasets contain 
countries’ roll-call votes for the years 1946–2008.123 Given that the Republic of China 
(ROC or Taiwan) occupied the UN seat up to 1971 and China (PRC) was absent from the 
whole session or otherwise ineligible from 1972–1973, this thesis covers the time period 
1974–2008.124  
Given the mechanics of UNGA voting, discussed in Chapter II, UNGA votes are 
a record of how a country voted on a given resolution.125 The literature debates what 
exactly UNGA votes measure and what it means if two countries vote in agreement126 
(e.g., “affinity” or dyadic UNGA voting behavior). For example, Ceren Altincekic 
wonders, “Is it interest, or norms? Is it capturing the manipulative power of industrial 
countries?”127 Similarly, Altincekic also questions what the dyadic voting behavior 
                                                 
122 See: Christopher Kilby, “The Political Economy of Conditionality: An Empirical Analysis of 
World Bank Loan Disbursements,” Journal of Development Economics 89, no. 1 (April 2008): 61–61; and 
Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data,” 2009, 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=38311&studyListingIndex=
0_dee53f12c760141b21c251525332. 
123 For a description of the Voeten dataset, please see “Codebook,” 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=38311&studyListingIndex=
0_dee53f12c760141b21c251525332 (accessed September 27, 2011). 
124 Dominguez covered the time period of 1991-2003. 
125 As previously discussed in Chapter II, the UNGA only records votes if a country specifically 
requests this function prior to voting. 
126 See, for example, Ceren Altincekic, “FDI Peace: Which “Capitalism” Leads to More Peace Among 
Dyads? One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper, October 2009, 
http://www.oneearthfuture.org/siteadmin/images/files/file_41.pdf (accessed September 30, 2011). 
127 Ibid., 8. 
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“represents with regards to strategic state interactions.”128 Additionally, Altincekic 
cautions against conceiving of UNGA votes as a “lump-sum category of behavior” given 
that “the issue at hand may largely determine the voting patterns of states.”129 Altincekic 
goes on to that that, “further research is needed to unpack affinity and its 
significance.”130 Stone, however, has another perspective on UNGA votes; he believes 
that the votes are “unimportant enough to serve as a sincere measure of countries’ foreign 
policy preferences.”131 Thus the votes capture “the similarity of two countries’ foreign 
policies.”132 Others in the literature also feel that the UNGA votes are of value.133  
2. The IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
The IMF publishes the International Financial Statistics (IFS)134 data monthly, 
which contains financial information it collects from a variety of courses. The dataset 
contains information on 200 countries and 32,000 time series on economic topics, to 
include balance of payments banking and financial systems, labor, international liquidity, 
prices, and trade. The majority of the annual data begin in 1948; quarterly monthly data 
                                                 
128 Ceren Altincekic, “FDI Peace: Which “Capitalism” Leads to More Peace Among Dyads? One 
Earth Future Foundation Working Paper, October 2009, 
http://www.oneearthfuture.org/siteadmin/images/files/file_41.pdf (accessed September 30, 2011), 8. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. What is interesting is that Altincekic (2009) finds that FDI, not trade, is a more significant 
determinant of peace between nations. For example, Altincekic (2009) states on page 10, “economic 
interdependence through FDI makes the benefits from conquest lower than before,” citing Stephen Brooks, 
Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). Altincekic (2009) continues on page 10, “Trade does not 
have the same effect as FDI because conquest gives access to primary goods, which can be traded. 
Conversely, invasion or war scares FDI out, which makes occupation less beneficial. These opposite effects 
of trade and FDI show that the former does not improve peaceful relations between states, but the latter 
does, significantly.” On page 16, Altincekic (2009) finds that, “The results are encouraging, pointing to the 
existence of an FDI peace: the more investment states receive and send to each other, the less likely they 
are to be involved in militarized disputes with each other.” 
131 Randall W. Stone, “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa.” American Political Science 
Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 580.  
132 Ibid. 
133 See, for example, William J. Dixon and Bruce E. Moon, “Political Similarity and American 
Foreign Trade Patterns,” Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 1 (March 1993): 5–25 and William J. Dixon, 
“The Emerging Image of U.N. Politics,” World Politics 34, no. 1 (1981): 47–61. 
134 Order access to online statistics at: http://www.imfbookstore.org/ProdDetails.asp?ID=IFEOL. 
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begin in 1957 and most balance of payments data begin in 1970.135 The IMF compiles 
the data from various different sources, such as government departments, central banks, 
the UN, International Labor Organization (ILO) and private financial institutions.  
3. The Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
The IMF publishes the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), which “provides 
data on the value of merchandise exports and imports between each country and all its 
trading partners.”136 Included are: total bilateral and multilateral exports and imports 
aggregated at national or regional group level; data for the most recent six quarters and 
the latest year for 169 countries, and ten quarters and five years for the world and area 
tables.137  
4. The World Development Indicators (WDI) 
The World Development Indicators (WDI)138 is World Bank’s primary collection 
of development indicators. The World Bank complies the data from officially recognized 
international sources. Data include the most current and accurate global development data 
available using national, regional and global estimates. The data reports on over 800 
indicators covering more than 150 economies. The World Bank releases the annual 
publication in April of each year and updates the online database three times a year. The 
thesis uses WDI data on GDP per capita, population, net FDI inflows and outflows and 
trade as a percentage of GDP. 
5. U.S. Aid Data 
This thesis uses data on U.S. aid to Brazil and China from the U.S. Agency for 
International Development’s U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan 
                                                 
135 See: International Monetary Fund. “Dataset Descriptions and Access to Data,” 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/access/dataset_overview.asp#desc_IMFIFS (accessed November 5, 
2011). 
136 See: International Monetary Fund, “Direction of Trade Statistics Online Subscription,” August 1, 
2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=20096.0 (accessed November 5, 2011). 
137 Ibid. 
138 World Bank. “World Development Indicators,” http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators. 
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Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2009, commonly referred to as the 
“Greenbook.”139 The Greenbook contains summary data of the U.S. Government foreign 
assistance from 1945 and offers detailed annual data for the last four fiscal years. 
Recipient countries report the data, which the Greenbook organizes by geographic region, 
without distinguishing between develop and developing nations. Any country recognized 
by the U.S. State Department as an “Independent State” that has received economic or 
military assistance since 1945 receives an individual country page.140  
6. FDI Data 
While several organizations141 collect FDI information, this thesis employs data 
for Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) into Brazil from two different 
organizations, namely the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), People’s Republic of 
China, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). MOFCOM has 
published both the 2009142 and 2010143 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment, which contain data on China’s OFDI from 2003–2009 and 2004–
2010, respectively. UNCTAD offers data on FDI stocks and flows by country of origin 
for 112 economies in the form of a Country Profile,144 one of which is Brazil.145 Brazil’s 
Country Profile contains FDI stock and flow data from 1990–2002. As neither 
organization provides a complete picture of these data, this thesis constructs its own 
                                                 
139 U.S. Agency for International Development. “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data,” U.S. Overseas 
Loans and Grants, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html. 
140 U.S. Agency for International Development. “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and 
Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 – September 30, 2009,” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT555.pdf 
(accessed October 24, 2011).  
141 The Brazilian Central Bank (See: http://www.bcb.gov.br ) also provides FDI data by country of 
origin for Brazil; however, because their website link for data on Chinese FDI did not function after several 
attempts, the thesis utilizes FDI inflow data from UNCTAD. 
142 Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), People’s Repubic of China. “Statistical Bulletin of China’s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/1316069658609.pdf 
(accessed November 15, 2011). 
143 Ibid. 
144 See: http://www.unctad.org/templates/page.asp?intItemID=3198. 
145 UNCTAD does not have an FDI Country Profile available for China. 
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measure of OFDI; this measure is discussed in the “Variables of Interest” section that 
immediately follows. 
Of significant concern is the lack of FDI data across time. To conduct an 
empirical analysis, this thesis requires sufficient observations of the dependent and 
independent variables. Even though this thesis has constructed a FDI data series from a 
variety of sources, the data series only has 19 observations, insufficient for econometric 
analysis. Given this deficiency, this thesis examines the hypothesis that FDI influences 
UNGA voting behavior using correlations in Chapter IV.  
D. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
This section of the thesis provides details on the variables of interest, which 
appear in the econometric model discussed below. The variables identified as variables of 
interest appear in the model as they may have an influence on Brazil’s UNGA voting 
pattern; thus, including them allows the model to more accurately predict their relation to 
the dependent variable. The main variables of interest are as follows: UNGA votes, FDI, 
Trade, and U.S. aid. 
1. UNGA Voting Affinity Measure 
This thesis constructs a measure of voting affinity to aggregate the discrete votes 
on UN resolutions into an annual measure. There are two different voting affinity 
measures constructed in the literature. One measure of voting affinity, the primary 
measure, allows for more variation in terms of voting affinity because it includes a third, 
intermediate value for coding votes. The other measure of voting affinity, the secondary 
measure, captures voting affinity extremes as it offers only two codes. This thesis uses 
both measures in its investigation of the influence of Chinese trade and FDI on Brazilian 
UNGA voting behavior. 
a. Primary Voting Affinity Measure   
Kilby includes votes that U.S. State Department deems important (which 
Kilby codes as KEY-VOTE_YES_1); these votes are not regular session votes. In order 
to track this addition to the data, Kilby codes votes as regular or not (variable “regular”). 
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Kilby uses the same data coding as Voeten, although he includes the country name as a 
Stata label. The vote codes are as follows: 1 = Yes; 2 = Abstain; 3 = No; 8 = Absent; and 
9 = Not eligible to vote or absent for whole session. 
Similar to Thacker,146 among others, Kilby’s data examines individual 
country pairs and assigns a 1 if the two countries vote the same (yes/yes, no/no, 
abstain/abstain, absent/absent), .5 if one country abstains or is absent when the other 
country is not (yes/absent or abstain, no/absent or abstain, absent or abstain/yes, absent or 
abstain/no), and 0 if one country votes yes and the other votes no. Kilby then averages the 
scores over the year to get the alignment variable (between 0 and 1).147 Kilby’s “U.S. 
important votes” measure averages over just the votes with KEY_VOTES_YES_1 equal 
to 1. His variable “U.S. other votes” measure averages over the votes with 
KEY_VOTES_YES_1 equal to 0. As the vast majority of votes occur near the end of the 
calendar year, Kilby uses lagged vote alignment in regression analysis. I use the Kilby 
dataset as it offers the most up-to-date data on UNGA voting and includes the U.S. State 
Department’s important votes. While this thesis focuses on the Sino-Brazilian 
relationship, Brazil may be less inclined to vote against the United States on these 
particular votes, even if it meant voting in opposition to China. A discussion of this (and 
thus an inclusion of these key votes in the econometric model), however, is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
b. Secondary Voting Affinity Measure  
The second measure of voting affinity also employs the Kilby dataset; this 
second measure, however only considers actions that Brazil and China take together. 
Barro and Lee,148 among others,149 calculate the fraction of times the countries of interest 
                                                 
146 Strom C. Thacker, “The High Politics of IMF Lending,” World Politics 52, no. 1 (October 1999): 
38–75. 
147 Thacker (1999) also codes votes in this way. 
148 Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “IMF-Programs: Who Is Chosen and What are the Effects?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 52, no. 7 (October 2005): 1245–1269. 
149 Axel Dreher, Rainer Thiele and Peter Nunnenkamp, “Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly 
Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis,” Public Choice 136, no. 1 (July 2008): 139–164, also use this particular 
coding measure. 
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vote together (either both voting no, both voting yes, both abstaining or both being 
absent) to construct a measure of voting affinity. For example, if Brazil and China vote 
“yes,” “no,” abstain, or are absent together, then Barro and Lee code the behavior as a 
‘1,’ otherwise they code it a ‘0;’ they then calculate the fraction of times the votes were 
the same given the number of total votes.150 
2. FDI Measure 
FDI, net inflows, according to the WDI, 
are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest 
(10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new 
investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from 
foreign investors. Data are in current U.S. dollars.151  
Given the problematic nature of collecting Chinese data on OFDI,152 this thesis 
uses available MOFCOM (2003-2010) and UNCTAD data153 (1990-2002) to construct a 
more complete measure of Chinese OFDI into Brazil. Given previously stated problem 
with the Central Bank of Brazil’s website, this thesis utilizes FDI inflow data from 
UNCTAD. Given the availability of Brazil’s stock and flow information, this thesis can 
calculate the FDI inflows for a few missing years; since data are available on inflows in 
2002, the approximated Chinese ODFI data calculates the average annual growth 
between 1995 and 2002.154 Clearly this constructed measurement is not without its 
                                                 
150 Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “IMF-Programs: Who Is Chosen and What are the Effects?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 52, no. 7 (October 2005): 1245–1269. 
151 The World Bank. “Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$),” 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (accessed December 7, 2011). 
152 For more information on these issues, see: Montfort Mlachila and Misa Takebe, “FDI from BRICs 
to LICs: Emerging Growth Driver,” IMF Working Paper 11/178, 2011; Rabin Hattari and Ramkishen 
Rajan, “Understanding Bilateral FDI Flows in Developing Asia,” Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 23, 
no. 2 (November 2009), 73–93; Karl P. Sauvant, The Journal of World Investment & Trade 6, no. 5 
(October 2005): 639–709. 
153 The “Data Sources” section discusses these available datasets. 
154 The average annual growth is 1.55 (in millions of $US). 
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drawbacks as countries seldom report FDI, whether inward or outward, in the same way, 
but it is the only way in which to utilize available data for the econometric model.   
3. Trade Measure 
Trade data, taken from UNTAD, DOTS and IFS datasets cover the following 
statistics: trade as a percentage of GDP (for China, Brazil and the United States), total 
value of imported and exported goods for all three nations, and bilateral values of 
imported and exported goods between each of the countries. This thesis uses data from 
1974 though data on Chinese imports to Brazil and the United States are not available 
until 1978. 
4. U.S. Aid Measure 
U.S. aid is the military and economic assistance that the United States provides to 
nations worldwide. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is 
predominately responsible for the implementing of U.S. aid. “In recent years more and 
more federal departments and agencies have begun receiving appropriated funds for 
international programs.”155 This thesis employs data on U.S. military and economic 
assistance obligated (both separately and aggregated) to China and Brazil, reported in 
constant 2009 $US and in historical $US. Not surprisingly, the Greenbook’s data on 
military aid to China are absent. This thesis uses data from 1974 though Chinese data are 
not available until 1980; Greenbook data extend to 2009 and to 2002 for Brazil and 
China, respectively.  
E. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will build on and improve the robustness of the Dominguez model.156 
His model examined the “relative coincidence in the voting behavior of China and 
several Latin American countries [including Brazil] in the United Nations General 
                                                 
155 U.S. Agency for International Development. “Tips for Researchers,” About the Greenbook, 
Overseas Loans and Grants, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/about/tips.html (accessed September 10, 2011). 
156 Jorge Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” 
Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (2006): 1–59. 
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Assembly,”157 relying on a simple correlation of voting coincidence over time to draw 
the conclusion that the Sino-Brazilian economic relationship had no effect on Brazil’s 
voting pattern. This thesis instead proposes a more robust model, which depends on 
multivariate regression analysis.  
The model is as follows:  
Voting affinityt  = α + β1Importst + β2Exportst + β3FDIt + β4USAidt +  
 β5GDPPCt + γt + εt 
(1) 
Where voting affinity is the percentage of total UNGA votes for Brazil and China 
that were the same in year t (i.e., the number of times Brazil and China had the same 
UNGA vote in year t divided by the total number of votes in year t). In this model 
“Imports” represents the percentage of Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
comprising imports from China; similarly, “Exports” are the percentage of Brazil’s GDP 
from its exports to China. The term FDI symbolizes the percentage of Brazil’s FDI from 
China. The coefficients of interest are β1, which measures the effects of changes in Sino-
Brazilian trade and their UNGA voting pattern, and β2, which measures the effects of 
changes in Sino-Brazilian FDI and their UNGA voting pattern. USAID represents the 
amount of U.S. aid. GDPPC is the GDP per capita, which represents the level of 
economic development. γt represents the time effects (i.e., time trend) and εt  is the error 
term. The “time trend” variable controls for any time specific trends in the data.  
While far from perfect, the model strives to address the endogeneity concerns 
inherent in the use of UNGA voting data by employing control variables. The model 
includes the following control variables: the level of economic development, represented 
by GDP per capita and the amount of U.S. aid. This thesis employs Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to explore whether Chinese trade or investment influences Brazil’s 
                                                 
157 Jorge Dominguez, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” 
Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (2006), 12. 
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UNGA voting behavior. The properties of the OLS estimator are well known 158 and take 
the form of:   
y  = β0 + β1x1 + … + βkxk + u (2) 
Where voting affinity is the dependent variable, voting affinity (y), and the 
explanatory variables are in the X matrix.  The OLS estimator is appropriate as a starting 
point as the dependent variable takes on values between zero  (no voting affinity) and one 
(perfect voting affinity). While the voting events are discrete outcomes (yes, no, abstain, 
absent), the voting affinity variable is the average of these discrete outcomes over a given 
time period.  As such, the voting affinity variable is continuous over the (0,1) range and 
the use of a discrete estimator (Logit, Probit) is not possible. 
F. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section further describes the estimation strategy’s variables of interest: FDI, 
trade, U.S. aid and GDPPC. This section also discusses the trends of these variables over 
time and represents the data graphically to demonstrate the changes. Additionally, Table 
offers statistics on the mean, standard deviation, min and max of the independent 
variables (IV) and dependent variables (DV).  
An examination of Table 1: Descriptive Statistics indicates that the largest 
number of observations for the independent variables is 35 and the lowest 19. 
Unfortunately, only having 19 observations for a variable, in this case, FDI, poses a 
challenge to the estimation strategy utilized in this thesis. The subsection on FDI below 
describes the challenges this has on interpreting the resultant data. Interestingly, Table 1 
indicates that the mean voting affinity using the primary measure (described in the 
subsection below) is dramatically higher for Sino-Brazilian voting affinity as compared 
to U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity, with a mean of 0.87 versus 0.35, respectfully. This 
demonstrates that, on average, Brazil votes with China 87% of the time, in comparison to 
voting with the United States, on average, 35% of the time. Similarly, in the secondary 
                                                 
158 See Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. (Mason, OH: South-
Western, 2003), and William H. Greene. Econometric Analysis (Fifth Edition) (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson Education, Inc., 2003). 
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measure of voting affinity (also described below), the mean is 0.76 for Sino-Brazilian 
voting affinity as opposed to the mere 0.19 mean for U.S. Brazilian voting affinity. This 
shows that, on average, Brazil votes with China 76% of the time, in comparison to voting 
with the United States, on average, 19% of the time. As far as inward FDI is concerned, 
China clearly receives more FDI than that of Brazil, with means of 2.89% of GDP and 
1.54% of GDP, respectively. For outward FDI, however, the United States leads the way, 
with a mean of 1.05% of GDP, whereas China and Brazil have means of 0.33% of GDP 
and 0.28% of GDP, respectively. 
Despite recent economic downturn, the economies of China and Brazil continue 
to have impressive rates of growth.159 The Sino-Brazilian economic relationship is also 
expanding, as evidenced by rising trade between the two nations. Brazil’s exports to and 
imports from China are also on the rise, which represents a growing percentage of 
Brazil’s total imports and exports; China’s exports to and imports from Brazil are also 
swelling, representing an increasing percentage of their total imports and exports.160  
1. Foreign Direct Investment  
Having discussed the trade composition by volume, it is important to debate the 
merits, or potential detriments, of this trade from each nation’s perspective. From the 
Brazilian view, for many reasons, trade with China is often bittersweet. While Brazil 
receives relatively little FDI from China, it has, over the years, been increasing.161 
As noted previously and illustrated in Table 1, there are insufficient observations 
to incorporate FDI into the empirical estimation in Chapter IV. Including FDI would 
reduce the number of observations to 19. A small sample size indicates that the properties 
of the OLS estimator are not known, thus any estimates are likely to be inconsistent (e.g.,  
not representative of the true population parameter) and inefficient (standard errors are 
                                                 
159 See Figure 13: GDP per capita, 1974–2008 and Figure 14: GDPPC growth rates, 1975–2008. See 
also Figure 10: Brazil’s exports to the United States and China, as a percentage of Brazil’s total exports; 
Figure 6: Brazil’s imports from the United States and China, as a percentage of Brazil’s total imports.  
160 See Figure 7: Growth rate in % of Brazilian imports, 1975-2008 and Figure: 11: Growth rates in % 
of Brazilian exports, 1975–2008. 
161 See Figure 2: Chinese OFDI into Brazil as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward FDI, 1992–2008 
and Figure 3: Growth rate in % of Chinese OFDI into Brazil. 
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biased in an unknown direction). As such, this thesis reports results of the simple 
correlation in the next chapter and discusses the evolution of Chinese FDI in the 
following section. 
While many argue that Brazil has benefitted from increased Chinese FDI, some 
note that Brazilian expectations of Chinese FDI have largely remained unmet.162 
Although Chinese FDI into Brazil is clearly on the rise, determining the true benefits to 
Brazil remains somewhat murky. Chinese FDI in Brazil arguably serves China more than 
it does Brazil; the bulk of Chinese investment is in support of infrastructure development 
associated with the resource extraction of Brazilian exports to China.163 While these 
infrastructure developments arguably benefit all of Brazil’s export markets, which other 
Latin American nations can then utilize, China often uses their own laborers, denying the 
additional benefits Brazil could gain from the employment of their own workforce.164 A 
discussion on Chinese FDI would be lacking, however, without drawing attention to what 
it is not doing in Brazil. China, for the most part, is not building factories and 
                                                 
162 See: Renato Baumann, “Some Recent Features of Brazil-China Economic Relations,” United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, April 2009, 
http://www.cebc.org.br/sites/500/521/00001316.pdf (accessed May 15, 2010) and Amaury de Souza, 
“Brazil and China: An Uneasy Partnership,” China – Latin America Task Force. Miami, FL: Center for 
Hemispheric Policy University of Miami, 2008, http://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-
policy/FinalVersionDeSouza21408.pdf  (accessed April 20, 2010). According to de Souza (2008), “China’s 
investment into Brazil is “far from impressive” and “tends to be export-oriented.” Perhaps fueling 
Brazilians dissatisfaction with the Chinese level of investment stemmed from President Hu Jintao’s 2004 
speech to the Brazilian congress where he allegedly promised to offer $100 billion in direct investment to 
Latin America. According to Jiang (2009), however, Hu was referring to trade, not investment. See: Shixue 
Jiang, “The Panda Hugs the Tucano: China’s Relations with Brazil. ChinaBrief 9, no. 10 (May 2009): 7–
10. 
163 Amaury de Souza, “Brazil and China: An Uneasy Partnership,” China – Latin America Task Force. 
Miami, FL: Center for Hemispheric Policy University of Miami, 2008, 
http://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/FinalVersionDeSouza21408.pdf  (accessed April 20, 2010).  
164 The complaint that China uses its own laborers is a common complaint throughout the region. See, 
for example, June T. Dreyer, “China’s Power and Will: The PRC’s Military Strength and Grand Strategy,” 
Orbis 51, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 651–654. For these reasons, the Brazilian Ministry of Labor has a history of 
limiting Chinese labor in Brazil; it accepted only 600 Chinese construction workers of a CSA (a joint 
venture between Germany’s ThyssenKrupp and Brazil’s Federation of Rio de Janeriro’s Industries aka 
Firjan) to build a coke plant near Rio de Janerio. See: People’s Daily. “Rio Industries Agree to Hire 
Chinese Workers,” Online News Archive, Beijing, China, December 21, 2006, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200612/21/archive.html (accessed April 10, 2010). 
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manufacturing plants to assemble products for export to China, which would then allow 
Brazil to capture additional value for its exports.165 
Chinese FDI in Brazil and the composition of Brazil’s exports to China have the 
tendency to suffer similar fates. This thesis is mostly concerned with trade volume; a 
discussion of trade composition is beyond the scope of the thesis. That said, the literature 
indicates that the majority of Brazil’s exports to China are agricultural goods and natural 
resources. Like the composition of Chinese FDI in Brazil, Brazil’s reliance on its 
agriculture and natural resources exports, which harkens back to Brazil’s colonial 
roots,166 often fails to capture the additional value added associated with higher end 
products. This focus on low-end products, some argue, could be detrimental to Brazil’s 
long-term economic development.167 Some authors argue that Brazil benefits from 
                                                 
165 The tide may be turning, however, as China’s Wuhan Iron and Steel Company (WISCO), China's 
third biggest steel maker, recently announced plans to build their first steel mill in Brazil; this comes after 
WISCO gained Chinese government approval for stock transaction with Mineracao e Metalicos SA 
(MMX), the Brazilian iron ore miner. WISCO registered an overseas company in Brazil, turning it into an 
operation; the company will be responsible for WISCO’s mining project and construction of the steel mill. 
The steel mill, which will be located outside of Rio de Janeiro, has a capacity of five million tons per 
annum; see: China Mining.“WISCO Starts To Build Its First Overseas Steel Mill in Brazil,” March 1, 2010, 
http://www.chinamining.org/Investment/2010-03-01/1267409371d34188.html (accessed April 18, 2010). 
According to the article, People’s Daily Online. “China To Build $5 Billion Steel Plant in Brazil,” April 16, 
2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6953613.html (accessed April 29, 2010), 
WISCO will have a 70% stake and MMX a 30% stake in the mill. Mr. Eike Batista, the owner of MMX, 
indicated that the mill would supply Brazil’s automobile, shipbuilding and oil platforms industries and the 
excess would go to China.  
166 “This is the same pattern of trade Brazil had in the 17th and 18th century.”- Mauricio Mesquita 
Moreeria, an economist at the Inter-American Development Bank (quoted in: Andre Soliani and Joshua 
Goodman, “China Beats Brazil In Own Backyard As BRIC Summit Seeks Unity,” Bloomberg 
Businessweek, April 14, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-14/china-beats-brazil-in-own-
backyard-as-bric-summit-seeks-unity.html (accessed April 18, 2010). 
167 The high demand for commodities can delay the diversification from extraction-based industries to 
value-added goods in some countries, potentially damaging future development options; see, Javier Santiso 
(Ed.) The visible hand of China in Latin America. (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), 2007). 
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focusing on commodity exports;168 others maintain that Brazil will eventually suffer from 
its purported deindustrialization.169 Chinese trade with and FDI into Brazil may also 
heighten environmental degradation and civil unrest given Brazil’s dependence on 
primary product exportation.170 A passing glance at the lumber industry offers an 
                                                 
168 “The possibility of exploiting the region’s comparative and competitive advantages in agriculture, 
opening new markets for products with restrictions (tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers, quotas, etc.) to enter 
the U.S. and the EU,” see: Gaston Fornes and Alan Butt-Philip, “A Review of the Literature On the 
Expansion of China’s Firms to Latin America,” Chinese Economic Association (UK) Conference, 2008, 
http://www.ceauk.org.uk/2008-conference-papers/Fornes-Gaston-Review-of-literature.pdf (accessed April 
5, 2010). Mario Osava, “Brazilians Feel Squeeze Amid China “Success.” Asia Times, February 23, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LB23Cb01.html (accessed April 13, 2010) quotes Sandra 
Ríos, head of the Centre for Integration and Development Studies (CINDES), as saying that Brazil’s 
heavily focused commodity trade with China is what “saved the Brazilian trade balance” during the global 
recession. 
169 See, for example, Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, “Brazil: Dances with Dragon. China’s Soft Power 
Drive Combined With Economic Interest Opens New Doors in Brazil,” Yale Global, December 1, 2009, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/brazil-dances-dragon (accessed April 16, 2010) and Mario Osava, 
“Brazilians Feel Squeeze Amid China “Success.” Asia Times, February 23, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LB23Cb01.html (accessed April 13, 2010). Osava (2010) 
quotes Mr. Jose Augusto de Castro, vice president of the Brazilian Trade Association, as saying the growth 
in trade with China is “a step backwards” for Brazil. Mr. de Castro further indicates that a reliance on 
commodities “generates low-grade jobs, whereas manufacturing employs skilled personnel for higher 
wages, creates a multiplier effect on employment as the production chain is longer, and expands the 
domestic market. David J. Lynch, “China’s Growing Pull Puts Brazil in a Bind. USA Today, March 21, 
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2006-03-21-brazil-china-cov-usat_x.htm (accessed April 10, 
2010); Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa and Ricardo C. Mendes, “Economic Relations Between Brazil and 
China: A Difficult Partnership,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Briefing Paper Dialogue on Globalization, 
January 2006 and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, “The Rising China and its Impacts On Latin America: 
Strategic Partnership Or a New International Trap? VII Reunión de la Red de Estudios de América Latina y 
el Caribe Sobre Asia-Pacífico (REDEALAP), August 27–28, 2008 Universidad Externado de Colombia: 
Bogotá, Colombia note that the influx of cheap manufactured goods from China has devastated the 
Brazilian manufacturing industry. Brazilian manufacturing exports to China have been decreasing. 
Similarly, despite the benefits of Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosur), Additionally, Brazilian 
manufacturing exports to the Latin American region have also been in decline; Argentina, for example, has 
replaced goods it traditionally imported from Brazil with those of China. See, for example, Barbosa (2008), 
and Amaury de Souza, “Brazil and China: An Uneasy Partnership,” China – Latin America Task Force. 
Miami, FL: Center for Hemispheric Policy University of Miami, 2008, 
http://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/FinalVersionDeSouza21408.pdf  (accessed April 20, 2010). R. 
Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2009), argues, however that Brazilian consumers have access to greater availability and that the 
price differential between Brazil and China’s manufactured goods often translates to either buying the 
Chinese good, or refraining from purchasing the good at all. 
170 Larry Rohter, “Brazil Weighs Costs and Benefits of Alliance With China,” The New York Times, 
November 20, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/20/international/americas/20amazon.html (accessed 
April 15, 2010) details some of the drawbacks to economically aligning itself with China.  
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example of how some trade and investment might better serve the interests of Brazil.171 
An in-depth examination of “good” and “bad” trade or investment, however, is beyond 







                                                 
171 World Resources International (WRI), “The Brazilian Pulp Industry Increase Production and 
Pulpwood Costs Are Going Up in 2009, Reports Wood Resource Quarterly,”August 2009, 
http://www.pr.com/press-release/177147 (accessed April 12, 2010) offers insight into the impacts of the 
lumber industry on Brazil. WRI (2009) also notes that China is increasingly purchasing Brazilian lands in 
the Amazon and beyond for timber and paper products exportation. Brazil presently restricts foreign 
individuals domiciled outside of Brazil or foreign companies organized outside of Brazilian law, from 
purchasing Brazilian lands; however, foreign individuals living in Brazil and foreign companies with a 
Brazilian branch are permitted to purchase Brazilian land; see Roberto R. Soares da Silva, “Foreign 
Ownership of Brazilian Rural Land: Rules, Restrictions, and Opportunities,” LexUniversal, October 22, 
2010, http://lexuniversal.com/pt/articles/3366 (accessed 15 April 15, 2010). In October of 2009, the 
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies “approved legislation that would further restrict foreign ownership of land 
along Brazil’s borders, and within the Amazon; see, U.S. Department of State, “2010 Investment Climate 
Statement – Brazil, March 2010, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138040.htm (accessed April 
10, 2010). China’s purchase of Brazilians lands, of course, extends beyond securing timberland. Chongqing 
Grain Group, a Chinese state company, for example, plans to purchase 100,000 hectares of land in the 
Brazilian state of Bahia to Produce Soy for the Brazilian and Chinese Markets, see: MacauHub.com, 
“Chinese State Company Plans to Invest In spy production in Brazil, 2010, 
http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/news.php?ID=9306 (accessed April 15, 2010). Natuza Nenry and Ana 
Paula Paiva, “Brazil Says Amazon Deforestation Slowest in 21 Years,” Reuters, November 12, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN12428323 (accessed April 20, 2010), note that, perhaps as a result of 
the Chinese land grab, deforestation grew in Brazil until it reached a peak in 2004. For further discussion 
on declining deforestation in Brazil, see: Richard Black, “Forest Loss Slows, As China Plants and Brazil 
Preserves,” BBC News, March 25, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8586701.stm (accessed April 21, 2010). 
R. Evan Ellis. China in Latin America. The Whats and the Wherefores. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2009), indicated that Chinese purchases of land and the increase in deforestation have witnessed 
a rise in protest from local indigenous population.  
172 Leandro Rothmuller, “Does FDI Matter for Trade in Brazil? An Application of the Gravity Model. 
Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 
c71, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of 
Graduate Programs in Economics]. Rio Dejaneiro, Brazil, 2003,indicates that if protest reach a sufficient 
size, they may not only prove to be an internally destabilizing political force, but they also could slow FDI 
into Brazil as investors shy away from foreign entanglements; a decrease in FDI, of course, may potentially 
stifle Brazil’s economic growth. 
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Anecdotally, one might conclude that increased levels of Sino-Brazilian trade or 
investment would positively influence Brazil’s UNGA voting patterns, which the 
literature commonly uses as a proxy for political influence or political compliance.173, 174 
The UNGA arguably acts as a barometer for both the worldview and for the political 
tendencies of a nation. 
Concerns over China’s growing influence have appeared in numerous newspaper 
articles.175 On the other hand, Brazilian politicians have stated their independence from 
China. These anecdotes suggest that determining the direction and significance of the 
relationship without empirical evidence is not fruitful. 
Looking at Figures 1–3, which graphically depict OFDI data, it appears that OFDI 
is, at times, volatile; this is true for both U.S. OFDI to Brazil and for U.S. OFDI to China. 
Brazil, for example, saw dips in their inward FDI from the United States in 1995 and in 
2001; China also saw a dip in 2001, which is to be expected given 9/11.176 Brazil saw a 
large spike in its inward FDI in 2003 and another spike, worthy of mention, in 2005. 
Similarly, China saw minor spikes in 1984, 1991 and in 2000. Chinese OFDI into Brazil 
has been relatively low and flat until 2002–2005, where it increased steadily. In 2005 the 
                                                 
173 See, for example, Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., “Trade Dependence and Foreign 
Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 191–
222. Others in the literature have examined the UNGA voting patterns of “aided nations” in an effort to 
measure “compliant behavior.” See, for example, Bruce E. Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent 
State,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 315–340; and Adrienne Armstrong, 
“The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 
(September 1981): 401–428.  
174 Although international trade is a “mode of exchanging commodities and currencies,” arguably 
“foreign policy behavior can also be considered an instrument of exchange;” in this case, foreign policy can 
be a “partial payment” for economic benefits Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegly, Jr., “Trade 
Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 
24, no. 2 (June 1980): 191–222. If trade is asymmetric, whereby one country is (relatively speaking) more 
economically dependent than another (relatively) more dominant country, then the dependent country “can 
satisfy the obligation of the asymmetrical exchange by supporting the foreign policy of the dominant 
country” (Richardson and Kegly, Jr. 1980). Political compliance, therefore, can result from an asymmetric 
economic relationship.  
175 See, for example, John Pomfret, “China Invests Heavily in Brazil, Elsewhere in Pursuit of Political 
Heft,” The Washington Post, July, 26, 2010; Sara Lana and Andrew Downie, “In Brazil, Hu Jintao Aims 
for Bigger Piece of Latin America Trade,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2010; Andrés Cala, 
“China Grabs Latin America, Well Ahead of Obama’s Outreach,” The Christian Science Monitor, March, 
21, 2011; James Morrison, “Chinese Power,” The Washington Times, May 11, 2005, World, Embassy Row, 
Page A15; Humphrey Hawksley, “Chinese Influence in Brazil Worries US,” BBC News, April 3, 2006.  
176 See Figure 1: Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) Flows 
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OFDI remained relatively stable and began increasing again in 2007. An examination of 
Figure 2, which shows Chinese OFDI into Brazil as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward 
FDI, indicates that Chinese OFDI into Brazil is fairly minimal, only rising above 0.005% 
in 2003; it spiked in 2005, but drastically declined until 2007, when it steadily began 
increasing. The growth rates of Chinese OFDI in Brazil (Figure 3) show similar patterns, 
with a spike in 1995, immediately followed by a steep decline, where the growth rates 
remained relatively flat until a spike in 2003, immediately followed by a steep decline. 
Growth rates returned to their flat state in 2004.  
2. Trade  
This thesis discusses imports and exports independently to offer a more complete 
picture of how trade may impact UNGA voting. This section offers varying perspectives 
on imports and exports for Brazil, China, and the United States. Figure 4, for example, 
examines total imports from all three countries from 1974–2008. The United States 
clearly stands out as the top importer, most likely given its relatively higher GDPPC 
(discussed in a subsection below). The United States steadily imported more goods every 
year during the period in question (with the exception of 2001, where U.S. imports 
dropped following the 9/11 terrorist attacks). China’s imports were relatively flat until 
they steadily began importing more around 1998. Brazil’s imports while relatively flat 
over the period in question, began increasing their imports slightly in about 2004.  
Figure 5 shows Brazil’s imports from both China and the United States over the 
1974–2008 period. Brazil imports much more from the United States than it does from 
China. Brazil’s imports from China have been relatively more stable than their imports 
from the United States, though they have been increasing dramatically from 2003. 
Brazil’s imports from the United States have mostly been rising steadily though they 
have seen modest dips (1983) and large dips (1999, 2001). Figure 6 shows Brazil’s 
imports form the United States and China as a percentage of their total imports; Brazil 
very clearly imports a much larger share from the United States than from China, where 
U.S. imports comprised over 25% of Brazil’s imports in four separate years during the 
period in question (1974, 1975, 1992 and 1993). In contrast, Chinese imports only 
 51
reached over a 15% share twice in the same period (2007 and 2008). Figure 7 depicts the 
growth rates in Brazil’s percentage of imports from the United States and China. It shows 
that Brazil’s growth rate in Chinese imports spiked in 1979, immediately falling to a 
much lower level where it remained until a much more modest increase in 1993, which 
returned to pre-1993 levels.  
Figure 8 illustrates total exports during the 1974-2008 period for all three nations. 
U.S. exports steadily increased over the time period, while those of Brazil and China 
remained relatively flat until about 1991, where they began increasing at a modest level; 
Chinese exports, however, increased at a much more rapid rate than that of Brazil. Figure 
9, shows Brazil’s exports to both the United States and China. The graph demonstrates 
that Brazil exports more to the United States (with minor increases in 1984, 1988 and 
1991) than to China. Also, Brazil’s exports to China have remained relatively flat until 
approximately 1999, where they began increasing a much more rapid level. Figure 10, 
Brazil’s exports to the United States and China, as a percentage of Brazil’s total exports 
clearly depicts that the United States holds a majority share of Brazil’s exports as 
compared to China; Brazil’s exports to the United States, for example, was over 25% of 
Brazil’s total exports 1984 through 1988 and in 2002. In comparison, Brazil’s exports to 
China were only over 5% of Brazil’s total exports 2003 through 2008. Figure 11 shows 
the growth rates in the percentage of Brazilian exports to Brazil and China. It 
demonstrates that the growth rate for U.S. export remained relatively steady, while 
growth rates for China spiked, to a large degree, in 1997 and in 1983, 1985, 1988 and 
1992, to a much more modest degree.  
3. U.S. Aid  
U.S. military and economic assistance to Brazil (as seen in Figure 12) over the 
period 1974–2008 has been relatively low. Brazil received the most assistance during this 
period in 1974, 1975 and 1976. U.S. assistance dropped dramatically in 1977 and 
remained low until the U.S. increased its assistance to a low level in 1998; since then aid 
levels have been fairly low.  
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4. GDPPC 
 Figure 13 shows GDP per capita for Brazil, China and the United States. The 
United States clearly leads the other two nations in terms of per capita GDP and Brazil’s 
per capita GDP exceeds that of China, nearly doubling it at times. Figure 14 displays the 
per capita GDP growth rates for all nations. U.S. growth rates have clearly been the most 
stable of the three nations while both Brazil and China’s growth rates have fluctuated 
wildly.  
5. Voting Affinity  
Figure 15 depicts the U.S. Brazilian voting affinity from 1974–2008. As Figure 1 
demonstrates, voting affinity between the two nations has largely trended downward, 
with occasional spikes in affinity. Given the sometimes-troubled relationship that the 
United States has had with the Latin American region generally, and Brazil specifically, 
observing this downward trend is unsurprising. This is, perhaps, particularly predictable 
given regional economic strife in the late 1980s and early 1990s, known as the “lost 
decade,” and the increasing political distancing between the United States and the Latin 
American region over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Figure 16 shows the Sino-Brazilian voting affinity from 1974–2008. As Figure 2 
depicts, voting affinity between the two nations has largely been relatively stable. 
Perhaps this is a result of the two nations sharing development and ideological goals and 
a South-South connection. What will be interesting to see is whether an upward trend will 
occur in the future as China becomes a more influential economic partner of Brazil; the 



















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16.   Sino-Brazilian voting affinity, 1974-2008 
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Table 1.   Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Primary measure of Sino-U.S. 
voting affinity 35 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.52 
Primary measure of Sino-
Brazilian voting affinity 35 0.87 0.05 0.72 0.94 
Primary measure of U.S.-Brazilian 
voting affinity 35 0.35 0.11 0.20 0.59 
Secondary measure of Sino-
Brazilian voting affinity 35 0.76 0.09 0.51 0.88 
Secondary measure of U.S.-
Brazilian voting affinity 35 0.19 0.08 0.09 0.37 
Secondary measure of Sino-U.S. 
voting affinity 35 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.22 
Brazil FDI, net inflows (% GDP) 34 1.54 1.35 0.13 5.08 
China FDI, net inflows  
(% of GDP) 27 2.89 1.91 0.21 6.25 
United States FDI, net inflows (% 
of GDP) 35 0.98 0.77 0.14 3.25 
Brazil FDI, net outflows  
(% of GDP) 34 0.28 0.52 -0.41 2.59 
China FDI, net outflows  
(% of GDP) 27 0.33 0.31 -0.01 1.18 
United States FDI, net outflows 
(% of GDP) 35 1.05 0.73 -0.03 2.96 
Brazil GDP (current US$) 35 5.08E+11 3.57E+11 1.05E+11 1.65E+12 
China GDP (current US$) 35 8.82E+11 1.03E+12 1.42E+11 4.52E+12 
United States GDP (current US$) 35 6.65E+12 3.85E+12 1.49E+12 1.43E+13 
Brazil GDPPC (current US$) 35 3.13E+03 1.75E+03 9.95E+02 8.63E+03 
China GDPPC (current US$) 35 710.2823 763.141 154.9721 3413.588 
United States GDPPC  
(current US$) 35 2.47E+04 1.20E+04 6.95E+03 4.70E+04 
Brazil population, total 35 1.51E+08 2.64E+07 1.06E+08 1.92E+08 
China population, total 35 1.13E+09 1.36E+08 9.00E+08 1.32E+09 
United States population, total 35 2.56E+08 2.80E+07 2.14E+08 3.04E+08 
Brazil, goods, value of exports, 
USD (total) 35 4.88E+04 4.40E+04 7.95E+03 1.98E+05 
China, goods, value of exports, 
USD (total) 35 2.26E+05 3.53E+05 6.94E+03 1.43E+06 
United States, goods, value of 
exports, USD (total) 35 4.84E+05 3.20E+05 9.94E+04 1.30E+06 
70 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Brazil, goods, value of imports, 
USD (total) 35 4.17E+04 3.64E+04 1.33E+04 1.82E+05 
China, goods, value of imports, 
USD (total) 35 1.95E+05 2.85E+05 6.66E+03 1.13E+06 
United States, goods, value of 
imports, USD (total) 35 7.46E+05 5.86E+05 1.06E+05 2.17E+06 
Brazil, goods, value of exports to 
China (USD, millions) 35 2.00E+03 3.56E+03 8.98E+00 1.64E+04 
Brazil, goods, value of exports to 
United States (USD, millions) 35 9.78E+03 7.12E+03 1.33E+03 2.77E+04 
Brazil, goods, value of imports 
from China (USD, millions) 35 2.07E+03 4.47E+03 3.30E-01 2.20E+04 
Brazil, goods, value of imports 
from United States  
(USD, millions) 
35 8.61E+03 6.17E+03 2.78E+03 2.84E+04 
Brazil's exports to China  
as a % of total exports 35 2.42 2.09 0.09 8.29 
Brazil's exports to United States  
as a % of total exports 35 2.13E+01 3.78E+00 1.40E+01 2.86E+01 
Brazil's imports from China  
as a % of total imports 35 2.73 3.05 0.00 12.09 
Brazil's imports from United 
States as a % of total imports 35 21.89 3.24 15.59 27.31 
China, goods, value of exports to 
Brazil (USD, millions) 31 1.95E+03 3.96E+03 8 1.88E+04 
China, goods, value of exports to 
United States (USD, millions) 
31 4.82E+04 7.21E+04 2.71E+02 2.53E+05 
China, goods, value of imports 
from Brazil (USD, millions) 31 3.45E+03 6.46E+03 63.2 2.96E+04 
China, goods, value of imports 
from United States (USD, 
millions) 
31 1.93E+04 2.10E+04 7.21E+02 8.17E+04 
United States, goods, value of 
exports to Brazil (USD, millions) 35 9.01E+03 7.20E+03 2.49E+03 3.29E+04 
United States, goods, value of 
exports to China (USD, millions) 35 1.41E+04 1.84E+04 1.35E+02 7.15E+04 
United States, goods, value of 
imports from Brazil  
(USD, millions) 
35 1.08E+04 8.02E+03 1.62E+03 3.21E+04 
United States, goods, value of 
imports from China  
(USD, millions) 
35 7.16E+04 1.03E+05 1.23E+02 3.56E+05 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
U.S. economic assistance, total, 
obligations in millions to Brazil,  
constant 2009 $US 
35 17.84 17.33 0.06 64.54 
U.S. military assistance, total, 
obligations in millions to Brazil, 
constant 2009 $US 
22 25.83 63.42 0.03 221.66 
U.S. economic and military 
assistance, total, obligations in 
millions to Brazil, constant 2009 
$US 
35 34.08 61.75 0.06 271.59 
U.S. economic assistance, total, 
obligations in millions to China  
constant 2009 $US 
23 23.22 28.84 0.21 104.97 
Approximated Chinese OFDI into 
Brazil (millions of $US) 19 76.17 119.55 0.00 462.03 
Natural log US economic 
assistance, total, obligations in 
millions to Brazil,  
constant 2009 $US 
35 2.21 1.48 -2.81 4.17 
Natural log of US military 
assistance, total, obligations in 
millions to Brazil,  
constant 2009 $US 
22 -0.34 2.64 -3.51 5.40 
Natural log of US economic and 
military assistance, total, 
obligations in millions to Brazil,  
constant 2009 $US 
35 2.40 1.70 -2.81 5.60 
Natural log Brazil GDPPC 
(current US$) 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter III of this thesis reviewed available data, data sources, and hypotheses 
and developed an estimation strategy to evaluate the hypotheses. This chapter tests for 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and employs OLS regression analysis to the 
econometric model as seen in Chapter III. Additionally, this chapter corrects for serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity using a Newey-West correction technique. Chapter IV 
reports the results and interprets them in the context of the thesis and the econometric 
model. The final chapter of this thesis, Conclusions, will offer insight into the results and 
will make suggestions for lines of future research.  
B. ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
As this thesis employs time series data from different countries, it needs to 
address two potential econometric issues: heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
Heteroskedasticity occurs when “the variance of the error term, given the explanatory 
variables, is not constant.”177 If this thesis does not control for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, then it will bias the standard errors in an unknown direction; “this in 
turn leads to a bias in test statistics and confidence intervals.”178 The other potential 
econometric issue is the presence of serial correlation. Serial correlation implies that 
there is correlation “between the errors in different time periods.”179 If this thesis does 
not correct for the presence of serial correlation, then “the OLS estimates of the standard 
errors will be smaller than the true standard errors. This will lead to the conclusion that 
the parameter estimates are more precise than they really are. There will be the tendency 
to reject the null hypothesis when it should not be rejected.”180 This section tests for 
                                                 
177 Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. (Mason, OH: South-
Western, 2003). 
178 Richard Williams, “Heteroscedasticity,” Sociology 63993: Graduate Statistics II. University of 




these issues and proposes corrections before proceeding to the estimation of international 
trade and U.S. aid’s impact on voting affinity. 
This thesis employs the Breusch-Pagan181/ Cook Weisberg182 test for 
heteroscedasticity using Equation (1) from Chapter III, built into STATA as the 
command hetest, to determine if it is in fact present.183 Conducting the test for 
heteroscedasticity on the primary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity demonstrates 
that the chi2(1) = 0.33, with prob > chi2 = 0.567. These results fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that heteroscedasticity is not present. The U.S.-Brazilian primary measure of 
voting affinity has a chi2(1) = 2.80, with prob > chi2 = 0.094; this rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 10% level. The secondary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity has 
a chi2(1) = 0.30, with prob > chi2 = 0.583; this fails to reject the null hypothesis. The 
secondary measure of U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity has a chi2(1) = 3.16, with a prob > 
chi2 = 0.075; this rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% level. Given that two of the four 
measures of voting affinity fail to reject the null hypothesis, heteroscedasticity appears to 
be present. To control for these effects, this thesis uses alternative estimators of the 
standard errors. Given that the White variance covariance correction for 
heteroscedasticity184 is equivalent to the Newey-West correction at lag 0, this thesis 
utilizes the Newey-West correction to correct the standard errors. 
Given time series data are often serially correlated, this thesis also tests for the 
presence of autocorrelation in the residuals (or prediction errors) using the Durbin-
Watson Statistic. The Durbin-Watson Statistic has the null hypothesis that the errors are 
serially independent (e.g., not autocorrelated)185 The results of the Durbin-Watson 
                                                 
181 Trevor Breusch and Adrian Pagan, “A Simple Test for Heteroscedasticity and Random Coefficient 
Variation," Econometrica 47, no. 5 (September 2009): 1287–1294. 
182 R. Dennis Cook and Sanford Weisberg, “Diagnostics for Heteroscedasticity in Regression,” 
Biometrika 70, no. 1 (1983): 1–10. 
183 Richard Williams, “Heteroscedasticity,” Sociology 63993: Graduate Studies II. University of Notre 
Dame, 2011, http://www.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l25.pdf (accessed December 4, 2011). 
184 Halbert White, “A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test 
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Statistic reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level for both primary measures of Sino-
Brazilian (d-stat = 0.96) and U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity (d-stat = 0.97), and for the 
secondary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity (d-stat = 0.95). Similarly, the results 
reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level for the secondary measure of U.S.-Brazilian 
voting affinity (d-stat = 1.15). Given the presence of serial correlation as well as 
heteroscedasticity, this thesis uses the Newey-West correction at lag 1. The corrected 
standard errors appear in parentheses in the tables below. 
C. EMPIRICAL RESULTS REGARDING THE SINO-BRAZILIAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
Turning first to the question of whether international trade influences voting 
affinity, this thesis finds evidence suggesting that Brazilian exports to China impact 
Brazil’s UNGA voting behavior (See Table 2), but only a weak and small effect. The 
estimated coefficient for Brazil’s exports to China as a percentage of Brazil’s total 
exports is positive and barely significant at the 10% level for both measures of voting 
affinity. This result is consistent across the two different measures of voting affinity. The 
coefficients of 0.016 and 0.028 indicate that a 1% increase in the ratio of Brazil’s exports 
to China to total Brazilian exports increases Brazil’s voting affinity by approximately 
1.6–2.8 percent, depending on the measurement of voting affinity.  
When the model considers Brazil’s imports from China as a percentage of 
Brazil’s total imports, however, the results are negative and not significant, using both 
measures of voting affinity. As this thesis is unable to reject the null hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficient for imports is statistically different from zero, this thesis can make 
no inferences about the sign or magnitude of this coefficient. This thesis recognizes it is 
curious that exports appear to influence voting affinity while imports do not. Whether or 
not this result is extendable to additional countries in Latin America is a question for 
future research.  
The results suggest that U.S. military and economic assistance to Brazil impacts 
Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. The estimated coefficient for U.S. military and economic 
assistance to Brazil is negative and significant at the 1% level and is consistent across 
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both measures of voting affinity. The coefficients of -0.022 and -0.037 indicate that a 1% 
increase in U.S. military and economic assistance to Brazil decreases Brazil’s voting 
affinity with China between 2.2–3.7 percent, depending on voting affinity measure. This 
finding is consistent with both the literature discussed in Chapter II, where it shows that 
the United States has the tendency to buy UNGA votes, and with U.S. practices given the 
U.S. State Department’s identification of key votes.  
The results also suggest that Brazil’s per capita GDP influences Sino-Brazilian 
voting affinity. The estimated coefficient for Brazil’s per capita GDP is positive and 
significant at the 10% and at the 5% level for the primary and secondary measure of 
voting affinity, respectively. The coefficients of 0.036 and 0.079 indicate that a 1% 
increase in Brazil’s per capita GDP increases Sino-Brazilian voting affinity by 3.6–7.9 
percent, depending on voting affinity measure. Quite possibly, given their South-South 
connection with China, Brazil’s world view and thus their UNGA voting, aligns more 
closely with China then with other, more developed countries, such as the United States. 
With a rise in Brazil’s per capita GDP, consequently, Brazil may feel more able to vote 
their conscience. Brazil’s increased level of economic wealth may give them the 
confidence to vote in alignment with perhaps less popular nations, such as China. As 
indicated in Chapter III, however, this thesis uses GDPPC to represent the level of 
economic development in the econometric model; GDPPC’s influence on voting affinity 
is not among the five hypotheses of interest.   
As Chapter III previously indicated, too few observations exist for the inclusion 
of FDI in the estimation strategy. Tables 4 and 5 contain the results of the simple 
correlations for both the primary and secondary, respectively, measures of Sino-Brazilian 
voting affinity. Looking at the primary method of voting affinity, the results indicate that 
there is a weak, negative relationship for all of the IVs: Brazil’s exports to China (as a 
percentage of Brazil’s total exports), Brazil’s imports from China (as a percentage of 
Brazil’s total imports), U.S. aid, Brazil’s per capita GDP, and Chinese FDI into Brazil (as 
a percentage of Brazil’s total inward FDI). This suggests that an increase in exports, 
imports, U.S. aid, GDPPC, or FDI will result in a corresponding decrease in Sino-
Brazilian voting affinity. Looking at the secondary method of voting affinity, the results 
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indicate that there is a weak, negative relationship for many of the IVs: Brazil’s imports 
from China (as a percentage of Brazil’s total imports), U.S. aid, and Brazil’s per capita 
GDP. This suggests that as imports, U.S. aid, and GDPPC increase, there will be a 
corresponding decrease in Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. Brazil’s exports to China (as a 
percentage of Brazil’s total exports) and Chinese FDI into Brazil (as a percentage of 
Brazil’s total inward FDI), however, have a weak, positive correlation to Sino-Brazilian 
voting affinity. This suggests that as exports and Chinese FDI increase, there will be a 
corresponding increase in Sino-Brazilian voting affinity.  
D. EMPIRICAL RESULTS REGARDING THE U.S.-BRAZILIAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
Table 3 reports the results of U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity using both the primary 
and secondary measure of voting affinity. Table 2’s results are distinctly different from 
those reported in Table 3, which lends itself to an interesting discussion regarding 
Brazil’s UNGA voting and subsequent foreign policy.  
The results indicate that Brazil’s exports to the United States, as a percentage of 
Brazil’s total exports, influence U.S.-Brazilian voting coincidence. The estimates 
coefficients are negative and strongly significant at the 1% level across both measures of 
voting affinity. The coefficients of -0.015 and -0.011 indicate that a 1% increase in 
Brazil’s exports to the United States decreases U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity by 1.1–1.5 
percent, depending on measure of voting affinity. These results, while highly significant, 
are in stark contrast to the Sino-Brazilian voting affinity, which saw a positive 
relationship between Brazil’s exports and voting affinity. What might explain this 
negative relationship? Perhaps Brazil’s corporate entities influence Brazilian politicians’ 
votes in the UNGA or perhaps Brazilian politicians think of Brazil’s relationship with the 
United States as a thing of the past, while its relationship with China, especially in the 
context of the BRICs is continuing to grow. While interesting, this is beyond the scope of 
the thesis, which is primarily concerned with the Sino-Brazilian voting relationship.   
The results indicate that Brazil’s imports from the United States, as a percentage 
of their total imports, influences U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity. The estimated coefficients 
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are positive and significant at the 1% level across both measure of voting affinity. Both 
coefficients of 0.013 indicate that a 1% increase in Brazil’s exports to the United States 
increases U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity by 1.3% for each measure of voting affinity. This 
suggests that Brazil’s reliance on U.S. imports increases their likelihood to vote in 
accordance with the United States, which one might expect. A further discussion of this, 
however, is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
When the model considers the relationship between U.S. military and economic 
assistance to Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity however, the results are negative 
and not significant, across both measures of voting affinity. Given the lack of 
significance, this thesis is unable to ascertain what exactly is the relationship between 
U.S. military and economic assistance and U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity.  
The results indicate that Brazil’s per capita GDP influence U.S.-Brazilian voting 
affinity. The estimated coefficients are negative and significant at the 1% level for the 
primary measure of voting affinity and insignificant for the secondary measure of voting 
affinity. The coefficients of -0.122 and -0.030 indicate that a 1% increase in Brazil’s per 
capita GDP will decrease U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity by 12.2%. Perhaps as Brazil’s 
GDPPC increase, they feel sufficiently independent to vote as they please, rather then 
feeling the need to vote in alignment with the United States. Again, this thesis is not 
concerned with Brazil’s GDPPC relationship with U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity; it is not 
one of the five main hypotheses.  
Tables 6 and 7 contain the results of the simple correlations for both the primary 
and secondary measures, respectively, of U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity. Looking at the 
primary method of voting affinity, the results indicate that there is a relatively weak, 
negative relationship for U.S. aid, Brazil’s per capita GDP, and Chinese FDI into Brazil 
(as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward FDI). This suggests that as U.S. aid, Brazil’s 
GDPPC, and Chinese FDI increase, U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity is decreasing. Brazil’s 
exports to the United States (as a percentage of Brazil’s total exports) and Brazil’s 
imports from the United States (as a percentage of Brazil’s total imports) has a positive, 
weak relationship to U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity. This suggests that as Brazil’s imports 
from and exports to the United States increase, U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity decreases. 
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Looking at the secondary measure of U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity, demonstrates similar 
results; all but the exports to (and imports from) the United States show a weak, negative 
relationship with U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity. This means that an increase in U.S. aid, 
Brazil’s GDPPC, and Chinese FDI results in a decrease in U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter III outlines five separate hypotheses to be explored in this thesis. This 
section reviews the results and discusses whether the results can reject the hypotheses.  
1. Hypothesis One  
All else being equal, a change in the level of exports from Brazil to China, as 
measured by the ratio of Brazilian exports to China to total Brazilian exports, may 
significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China. Given the results 
reported in Table 2, this thesis rejects the null hypothesis. It appears that Brazil’s exports 
to China have a statistically significant, positive relationship to Sino-Brazilian voting 
affinity. One might expect these results, as Brazil may want to vote in alignment with a 
growing economic partner, such as China. Thus, Brazil and China are likely to form a 
stronger political relationship as Brazil’s exports to China increase.  
While clearly a less robust measure of the relationship between the ratio of 
Brazil’s exports to China and the primary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity, it is 
perhaps worthy of reiteration that a weak, negative relationship exists between Brazil’s 
exports to China and Sino-Brazilian voting affinity, which is unexpected. A weak, 
positive relationship, however, exists between the ratio of Brazil’s export to China and 
the secondary measure of voting Sino-Brazilian voting affinity; this is in keeping with 
both the regression results and what we might expect of the relationship.   
2. Hypothesis Two  
All else being equal, a change in the level of imports from China to Brazil, as 
measured by the ratio of Brazilian imports from China to total Brazilian imports, may 
significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China. Given the lack of 
statistically significant results on the relationship between Brazil’s imports from China 
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and their level of voting affinity, this thesis fails to reject the null hypothesis, lending 
little insight into the relationship between the two. The correlations indicate, however, 
that the ratio of Brazil’s imports to their total imports has a weak, negative relationship to 
both the primary and secondary measures of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity.  
While the correlation is a less robust measurement of the relationship, the results 
are unexpected. It is conceivable that as Brazil imports more from China (as a percentage 
of Brazil’s total imports) that they become more politically involved and thus feel more 
comfortable voting against China in the UNGA. After all, Brazil controls whether or not 
and at what level they import from China.  
3. Hypothesis Three  
All else being equal, a change in the level of Chinese FDI in Brazil, as measured 
by the ratio of Chinese FDI to total FDI in Brazil, may significantly influence Brazil’s 
UNGA voting affinity with China. Given a distinct lack of available data on Chinese FDI 
into Brazil, dropping FDI from the regression became necessary to reach a sufficient 
number of observations. Unfortunately, this means that this thesis cannot comment on the 
relationship between Chinese FDI into Brazil and Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. Perhaps 
as data become available, this will be a valid future research question.  
The correlation suggests, however that there is a weak, negative relationship 
between Chinese FDI into Brazil (as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward FDI) and the 
primary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. Using the second measure of Sino-
Brazilian voting affinity, however, suggests a weak, positive relationship with Chinese 
FDI into Brazil. The disparity between the different measures of voting affinity is 
curious. Given the literature on FDI, one might expect a positive relationship between 
FDI and voting affinity as higher levels of investment may incentivize similar voting in 
the UNGA. 
4. Hypothesis Four  
All else being equal, a change in the level of U.S. aid to Brazil, as measured by 
U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil, may significantly influence Brazil’s 
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UNGA voting affinity with China. Given the results reported in Table 2, this thesis rejects 
the null hypothesis; results suggests that U.S. military and economic assistance to Brazil 
have a negative, statistically significant relationship to Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. 
This result largely makes sense as the literature suggests that the United States can often 
influence UNGA voting, especially on those votes which the U.S. State Department 
indicates are key votes; the United States directly links U.S. aid to the voting outcomes 
on these key votes. 
5. Hypothesis Five  
All else being equal, a change in the level of U.S. aid to Brazil, as measured by 
U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil, may significantly influence Brazil’s 
UNGA voting affinity with the United States. Given the lack of statistically significant 
results on the relationship between U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil and 
U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity, this thesis fails to reject the null hypothesis. This is 
interesting, as the literature tends to support the idea that the United States purchases 
UNGA votes. Perhaps a larger sample size would lend insight into this phenomenon. 
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Table 2.    Sino-Brazilian voting affinity  
 
 
Primary measure of 
voting affinity 
between Brazil and 
China 
Secondary measure 
of voting affinity 
between Brazil and 
China 
Brazil's exports to China as 






Brazil's imports from 
China as a percentage of 





U.S. aid to Brazil 








Brazil's GDPPC 0.036*  (0.018) 
0.079**  
(0.027) 
Number of observations 35 35 
R-squared 0.5306 0.5542 
   
Quantities in parentheses are Newey-West lag 1 corrected standard errors. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant 
at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.   U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity 
 
 
Primary measure of 
voting affinity 
between Brazil and 
the United States 
Secondary measure 
of voting affinity 
between Brazil and 
the United States 
Brazil's exports to the 
United States as a 






Brazil's imports from the 
United States as a 






U.S. aid to Brazil 







Brazil's GDPPC -0.122***  (0.029) 
-0.030  
(0.024) 
Number of observations 35 35 
R-squared 0.6128 0.3835 
   
Quantities in parentheses are Newey-West lag 1 corrected standard errors. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at 























a % of 
total 
imports 



























1      
Brazil's 
exports to 
China as a % 
of total 
exports 
-0.05 1.00     
Brazil's 
imports from 
China as a % 
of total 
imports 
-0.18 0.94 1.00    














-0.52 0.29 0.75 0.32 1.00  
Chinese FDI 
into Brazil as a 
% of Brazil's 
total inward 
FDI 
-0.14 0.83 0.82 0.58 0.58 1.00 
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Table 5.   Correlations for secondary measure of  
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1.00      
Brazil's 
exports to 
China as a % 
of total exports 
0.10 1.00     
Brazil's 
imports from 
China as a % 
of  
total imports 
-0.00 0.94 1.00    







to Brazil,  
constant 2009 
$US 




-0.30 0.59 0.75 0.32 1.00  
Chinese FDI 
into Brazil as a 
% of Brazil's 
total inward 
FDI 
0.01 0.83 0.82 0.58 0.58 1.00 
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1.00      
Brazil's 
exports to the 
United States 
as a % of total 
exports 




States as a % 
of total 
imports 
0.68 0.56 1.00    














-0.23 -0.79 -0.69 0.32 1.00  
Chinese FDI 
into Brazil as a 
% of Brazil's 
total inward 
FDI 
-0.66 -0.48 -0.81 0.58 0.58 1.00 
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1.00      
Brazil's exports 
to the United 
States as a % 
of total exports 




States as a % 
of total imports 
0.51 0.56 1.00    













-0.08 -0.79 -0.69 0.32 1.00  
Chinese FDI 
into Brazil as a 
% of Brazil's 
total inward 
FDI 
-0.47 -0.48 -0.81 0.58 0.58 1.00 
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The major research question of this thesis focused on an examination of whether 
the increased level of Sino-Brazilian trade or investment significantly influenced Brazil’s 
voting in the UNGA, which the literature commonly uses to represent political influence. 
This question is of importance to the United States for political, economic and national 
security reasons. Given Brazil’s geographic proximity to the United States, the United 
States often views the regional involvement of other nations, especially that of China, 
cautiously. Brazil is an important regional player; it is Latin America’s most populous 
nation and has a growing economy. While the United States was Brazil’s number one 
trading partner, in 2009, China overtook the United States. In part for this reason, Brazil 
increasingly values its economic relations with China. If the Sino-Brazilian economic 
relationship influences Brazil’s foreign policy, as evidenced by their votes in the UNGA, 
then it may signal an increase in Chinese influence over Brazil. From the U.S. 
perspective, any increase in Chinese influence may translate into a corresponding 
decrease in U.S. influence in both Brazil and, given Brazil’s importance, in the region as 
well. A decline in U.S. influence in Brazil could have implications for the health of 
Brazil’s democracy, regional stability and U.S. national security. If the United States 
loses standing in Brazil, then it could potentially see decreases in its influence elsewhere 
in the region. This thesis also addressed to what degree, if any, U.S. military and 
economic assistance influences Brazil’s voting affinity with both the United States and 
with China. If U.S. aid to Brazil bolsters U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity, then perhaps the 
United States may be able to increase their aid to Brazil to influence additional votes.  
B. RECAP OF THESIS STRUCTURE 
To examine the above research questions, this thesis began with a brief review of 
the relevant history pertaining to the UNGA and discussed UNGA voting, its 
mechanisms and the agenda-setting process. Following an examination of the UNGA, 
this thesis considered the literature on the determinants of voting, specifically focusing on 
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the effects of asymmetrical economic relationships, the implications of ideology, and 
whether trade fosters alliances (or whether alliances foster trade). The thesis then 
proceeded to review the literature on Sino-Brazilian relations, characterizing them in 
terms of both their political and their economic interactions. It then discussed the very 
limited empirical evidence on whether Sino-Brazilian trade or investment influenced the 
way in which Brazil votes in the UNGA. The thesis then developed an empirical 
methodology for investigating the influence of international trade (disaggregated into 
imports and exports), international economic and military assistance and FDI on Sino-
Brazilian UNGA voting. It specified five testable hypotheses, described data sources, 
presented the variables of interest, discussed the empirical model, and provided 
descriptive statistics on the variables in question. Following a review of the data and 
methodology, the thesis presented and discussed the results of the OLS regressions and 
simple correlations, highlighting the econometric issues with the estimator of choice.   
C. ADDRESSING A LITERATURE GAP 
The methodology used in this thesis offers an improvement over previous studies 
in the literature, which evaluated the relationship between Sino-Brazilian UNGA voting 
affinity and trade; previous studies relied on simple correlations. This thesis crafted, for 
the first time in the literature on Sino-Brazilian relations, an estimable empirical model 
examining whether trade or investment influences voting behavior between these two 
nations. The empirical model used the following main variables: UNGA votes, FDI, 
trade, and U.S. aid. While the model improved past analyses, it is not without its own 
econometric issues. Given that the thesis employed time series data from different 
countries, it tested for and ultimately found evidence of both heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation; it used the Breusch-Pagan / Cook Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity and the 
Durbin-Watson Statistic to test for the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. It then 
utilized the Newey-West test at lag 1 to correct for the serial correlation.  
D. HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 
This thesis made five hypotheses, and tested them with two types of voting 
affinity measurements for both regression analysis and simple correlations. All else being 
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equal, this thesis hypothesized the following: (1) a change in the level of exports from 
Brazil to China, as measured by the ratio of Brazilian exports to China to total Brazilian 
exports, may significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; (2) a 
change in the level of imports from China to Brazil, as measured by the ratio of Brazilian 
imports from China to total Brazilian imports, may significantly influence Brazil’s 
UNGA voting affinity with China; (3) a change in the level of Chinese FDI in Brazil, as 
measured by the ratio of Chinese FDI to total FDI in Brazil, may significantly influence 
Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; (4) a change in the level of U.S. aid to Brazil, 
as measured by U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil, may significantly 
influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; and (5) a change in the level of U.S. 
aid to Brazil, as measured by U.S. economic and military assistance to Brazil, may 
significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with the United States.  
Based on the results of the regression analysis, this thesis rejected the null 
hypothesis (1), all else being equal, that a change in the level of exports from Brazil to 
China, as measured by the ratio of Brazilian exports to China to total Brazilian exports, 
may significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China. Brazil’s exports 
to China had a statistically significant, positive relationship to Sino-Brazilian voting 
affinity. This outcome is perhaps expected as Brazil may wish to vote in alignment with a 
growing economic partner, such as China. Thus, Brazil and China are likely to form a 
stronger political relationship as Brazil’s exports to China increase. Interestingly, there 
was a weak, negative correlation, a less robust measurement, between the ratio of Brazil’s 
exports to China and the primary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity, which is 
unexpected. A weak, positive correlation, however, occurred between the ratio of Brazil’s 
export to China and the secondary measure of voting Sino-Brazilian voting affinity; this 
is in keeping with both the regression results and what we might expect of the 
relationship. What remains unclear is what accounted for the difference between the two 
calculations.    
Due to a lack of statistically significant results, this thesis failed to reject 
hypothesis (2), that, all else being equal, a change in the level of imports from China to 
Brazil, as measured by the ratio of Brazilian imports from China to total Brazilian 
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imports, may significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China.  While 
the correlation is a less robust measurement of the relationship, the results were 
unexpected. Conceivably, as Brazil imported more from China (as a percentage of their 
total imports) they became more politically involved and thus felt more comfortable 
voting against China in the UNGA. Brazil, as the importing country, had control over 
whether, and at what level, they imported from China; perhaps this emboldened them to 
vote as they pleased in the UNGA.  
This thesis found that for hypothesis (3), all else being equal, a change in the level 
of Chinese FDI in Brazil, as measured by the ratio of Chinese FDI to total FDI in Brazil, 
may significantly influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China, however, it was 
necessary to drop Chinese FDI from the regression to reach a sufficient number of 
observations to run the econometric model. Given this deficiency, this thesis relied on 
simple correlations to analyze the relationship between Chinese FDI into Brazil and Sino-
Brazilian voting affinity. The correlations indicated that there was a weak, negative 
relationship between Chinese FDI into Brazil  (as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward 
FDI) for the primary method of Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. A weak, positive 
correlation, however, existed between the secondary measure of Sino-Brazilian voting 
affinity and Chinese FDI into Brazil (as a percentage of Brazil’s total inward FDI). The 
disparity between the different measures of voting affinity proved interesting. Given the 
literature on FDI, one may have expected a positive relationship between FDI and voting 
affinity as higher levels of investment may incentivize similar voting in the UNGA. What 
remains unclear is why the disparity exists between the two measures of voting affinity; 
maybe additional data would reconcile the correlations for different voting affinity 
measures.  
This thesis rejected the null hypothesis (4), that a change in the level of U.S. aid 
to Brazil, as measured by U.S. economic and military aid to Brazil, may significantly 
influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with China; the results indicated that U.S. 
military and economic assistance to Brazil had a negative, statistically significant 
relationship to Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. This result fit with the literature, which 
indicated that U.S. aid can often influence UNGA voting, especially on those votes which 
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the U.S. State Department indicates are key votes; the United States directly links its aid 
decisions to the voting outcomes on these key votes.    
The thesis failed to reject the null hypothesis (5), that a change in the level of U.S. 
aid to Brazil, as measured by U.S. economic and military aid to Brazil, may significantly 
influence Brazil’s UNGA voting affinity with the United States, due to a lack of 
statistically significant results. This is interesting, as the literature tends to support the 
idea that the United States purchases UNGA votes. Perhaps a larger sample size would 
lend insight into this phenomenon. What was most interesting about this finding, 
however, is the fact that while the United States may be able to dissuade Sino-Brazilian 
voting affinity through economic and military assistance to Brazil, it was not able to 
bolster its own Brazilian voting affinity through the same measure. What accounts for 
this distinction? Perhaps Brazil is suspicious of U.S. aid and makes a marked attempt to 
vote independently of the United States; at the same time, Brazil may feel that voting in 
alignment with China is a more egregious offense than not voting with the United States. 
Analyzing the regression results with the addition of a U.S. key votes variable, which are 
votes that the U.S. State Department ties to its aid allocation decisions, would no doubt 
be an interesting line of further research. 
E. SUGGESTED LINES OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this thesis only concerned itself with five testable hypotheses for voting 
affinity within the UNGA, it brought up potentially interesting ideas for further research 
on voting affinity, both within and outside the UNGA. First, as previously mentioned, it 
would be compelling to include U.S. key votes as a variable in the regression analysis 
and compare it to other, non-key votes. One would expect that U.S. key votes would have 
a higher degree of U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity and a lower degree of Sino-Brazilian 
voting affinity. Second, given a lack of available data, waiting for China to release 
additional OFDI data over the next several years would allow for its inclusion in the 
regression; this would increase the robustness of any findings on the relationship between 
Chinese FDI into Brazil and Sino-Brazilian voting affinity. Third, it would be interesting 
to determine whether including a measure of Brazil’s approval of the United States, 
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perhaps from the Latinobarómetro186 opinion poll, would influence voting affinity for 
either the United States or for China. One might expect that as Brazil’s opinion of the 
United States falls, so too does its voting affinity; this, in turn, may result in a rising 
voting affinity with China. Fourth, categorizing the UNGA votes in terms of their 
significance may shed light onto the type of voting affinity that Brazil shares with both 
the United States and China. For example, Brazil may have a higher voting affinity with 
China on issues of sovereignty and development. Categorizing these votes, however, 
would be relatively subjective and time consuming. Fifth, examining both Sino-Brazilian 
and U.S.-Brazilian voting affinity in the UN Security Council may prove an intriguing 
line of future research. As China and the United States are both permanent members of 
the Security Council, and the UNGA has elected Brazil as a rotating member of the Latin 
American and Caribbean Group a total of ten times, there may be adequate data to 
examine those voting outcomes. Sixth, broadening this study to include all Latin 
American nations would increase the number of available observations and thus 
strengthen the robustness of the resultant voting affinity analyses. While these 
aforementioned lines of future research were beyond the scope of this thesis, they would 
no doubt produce a more significant contribution to the voting affinity literature and 




                                                 
186 See: http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp. 
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